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Abstract
A signifi cant amount of resources is spent every year on the improvement of transportation 
infrastructure in developing countries. In this paper, we investigate the effects of one such 
large project, the Golden Quadrilateral in India. We do so using a model of internal trade 
with variable markups. In contrast to the previous literature, our model incorporates several 
channels through which transportation infrastructure affects welfare. In particular, the model 
accounts for gains stemming from improvements in the allocative effi ciency of the economy. 
We calibrate the model to the Indian manufacturing sector and fi nd real income gains of 
2.7%. We also fi nd that allocative effi ciency accounts for 7.4% of these gains. The importance 
of allocative effi ciency varies greatly across states, and can account for up to 18% of the 
overall gains in some states. The remaining welfare gains are accounted for by changes in 
labor income, productive effi ciency, and average markups that affect states’ terms of trade.
Keywords: transportation infrastructure, internal trade, welfare, allocative effi ciency.
JEL classifi cation: F12, F14, O40.
Resumen
Cada año se invierte una signifi cativa cantidad de recursos en mejorar las infraestructuras 
de transporte de los países en desarrollo. En este artículo investigamos los efectos de 
un gran proyecto de este tipo: el Golden Quadrilateral de la India. Para ello, utilizamos un 
modelo de comercio interno con márgenes variables. En contraste con la literatura previa, 
el modelo incorpora diversos canales a través de los cuales la infraestructura de transporte 
afecta al bienestar. En particular, el modelo tiene en cuenta las ganancias provenientes 
de la efi ciencia en la asignación de recursos en la economía. Calibramos el modelo para 
el sector manufacturero de la India y encontramos que las ganancias reales del producto 
ascienden al 2,7 %. Además, la mejora en la asignación explica el 7,4 % de dichas ganancias. 
La importancia de este canal varía en gran medida por Estados, pudiendo explicar hasta el 
18 % de las ganancias en algunos de ellos. El resto de la mejora en el bienestar se explica 
por cambios en los ingresos laborales, la efi ciencia productiva y los márgenes medios, que 
afectan a los términos de intercambio de los Estados.
Palabras clave: infraestructura, comercio interno, bienestar, asignación de recursos.
Códigos JEL: F12, F14, O40.
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1 Introduction
Poor transportation infrastructure is a common feature in low-income countries. For example, in
2000, it would take a truck four to five days to drive the 1,500 km distance between Delhi and
Calcutta, which is five times longer than it would in the United States. International organizations
and policymakers have not overlooked this fact: between 1995 and 2005, upgrades to the trans-
portation network constituted around 12% of total World Bank lending. Out of this, 75% was
allocated to upgrading roads and highways. Given the resources that are invested into transporta-
tion infrastructure, understanding the impact of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects
is a matter of importance to both researchers and policymakers.
We use the example provided by a recent large-scale highway development project in India
to quantitatively evaluate the welfare gains which stem from improving the transportation infra-
structure within a country. We study the construction of the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ), which
provided India with 5,800 km of modern highway that connected India’s four major metropolitan
areas (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, and Calcutta). Construction was rapid for a project of this scale,
starting in 2001 and 90% being completed by the end of 2006.
Our main contribution is to quantify the gains from the construction of the GQ in a setting
which allows us to distinguish among various channels that can affect welfare. One channel that
we consider is the traditional Ricardian channel. This channel has been emphasized by prominent
papers in the existing literature, such as Donaldson (Forthcoming) and Donaldson and Hornbeck
(2016). Another channel that we study is how the GQ affected the allocative efficiency of the
economy. Thus, we examine how new transportation infrastructure improves the allocation of
resources across firms and how this affects the aggregate gains from new transportation infrastruc-
ture.
We use a quantitative trade model à la Atkeson and Burstein (2008) in which all of the states
of India trade with each other. Firms compete oligopolistically, which implies that firms charge
variable markups depending on the level of competition in a market. This framework is useful
to study the effects of high transportation costs on the allocative efficiency of the economy. The
reason is that firms with high markups are inefficiently small relative to firms with low markups.
Changing transportation costs, by affecting the pattern of spatial competition, will thus impact
the distribution of markups and allocative efficiency.
To discipline the parameters of our model, we use plant-level data of the India’s manufacturing
sector and transportation network. We derive a set of structural equations to estimate these para-
meters. In particular, we use a two-step approach that allows us to estimate transportation costs
and the elasticity of the sectoral demand curve even without having access to direct information on
trade flows across Indian regions. This methodology provides a straightforward way of identifying
these parameters in a manner that is fully consistent with the model.
In the first step, we estimate transportation costs between Indian states using a methodology
similar in spirit to the one used by Donaldson (Forthcoming). We show that in the model trans-
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portation costs can be identified by comparing the prices charged across locations by firms that
are monopolistic producers at the national level. This is the case because the prices charged by
these firms only depend on transportation costs since the level of competition they face is constant
across space. To implement this strategy, we first identify all the goods that are produced by
only one plant in India. For these goods, we regress the prices paid across destinations with the
effective distance between origin and destination. This measure of effective distance is the lowest
cost path given the infrastructure quality in place at the time. We find that the transportation
costs implied by this method are similar to those found in additional micro-level pricing data that
we collect.
In the second step, we estimate the elasticity of the sectoral demand curve. This parameter is
important since it governs the size of markups for firms with a large degree of market power. We
use the fact that, for goods produced by monopolistic producers, the model implies a standard
gravity equation that relates internal flows to transportation costs. Using the transportation costs
from the first step, we find the elasticity of the sectoral demand curve that is consistent with the
gravity equation for monopolistic products in the data.
We use our calibrated model to quantify the effects of the construction of the GQ. To do so,
we compare outcomes from the model when we feed in the estimated transportation costs with
and without the GQ. We find real income gains of 2.72% in the Indian manufacturing sector,
equivalent to $4.2 billion per year.1 A back of the envelope calculation shows that these gains are
large relative to the initial construction costs, which are $5.6 billion. Thus, our results imply that
it would take less than two years for India to recover the initial construction cost. We also find a
high degree of heterogeneity in income changes across states, including some states that lose.
We decompose the welfare gains into different components using the theoretical result developed
by Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014). The Ricardian component is simply the gains in real income
if all firms charged their marginal cost. This component maps back to welfare in models in
which all firms have the same markup or operate in perfect competition. The allocative efficiency
component relates to the welfare loss resulting from misallocation arising due to heterogeneous
markups charged by firms. Finally, the markups terms of trade component compares the average
markup of the goods sold with the average markup of the goods purchased by a state. Ceteris
paribus, states with high markups on the goods that they sell relative to the goods that they buy
will enjoy a higher real income.
From a research perspective, understanding the effects of new infrastructure on allocative ef-
ficiency is perhaps the most interesting part of our analysis. First, it is a channel that has been
previously unexamined in the literature that quantifies the welfare gains from transportation in-
1We arrive at this number by multiplying the manufacturing value added share in India (16%) by the Indian
GDP in 2006 ($949 billion) by 2.72%. The implied gains as a fraction of total national income is 0.44% (2.72%*16%).
frastructure. At the same time, papers such as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) suggest that allocative
efficiency is an important driver in explaining cross-country income differences and our understan-
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ding of the particular forces driving these inefficient allocations is still limited. If high transporta-
tion costs lead to low levels of allocative efficiency, then lowering transportation costs in countries
like India could result in gains previously not considered by the literature through the allocative
efficiency channel.
We find that the allocative efficiency component accounts for 7.4% of the overall gains. We also
find that there are large differences in the importance of allocative efficiency gains across states.
In fact, allocative efficiency can account for up to 18% of the overall gains at the state level. These
gains are concentrated in the largest states since these are the states with the initial lowest levels
of allocative efficiency. This is because firms located in the largest states tend to have on average
lower marginal costs. These lower marginal costs provide a cost advantage to local firms, which
allows them to charge high markups.
Finally, we conduct a reduced form empirical exercise to examine if there is evidence in the
data for the main mechanisms of the model. We estimate a differences-in-differences specification
in which we compare economic outcomes for locations close to the GQ with those that are far away,
before and after the construction of the highway. First, we show that prices paid for intermediate
inputs declined more in areas close to the GQ. Second, we find that the Olley and Pakes (1996)
covariance term between size and productivity increased more in areas close to the GQ, suggesting
that the GQ improved allocative efficiency. These empirical findings are consistent with the model
output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related
literature. In Section 3, we describe the main characteristics of the road network in India. In
Section 4, we present the model. In Section 5, we describe the data used. In Section 6, we discuss
the calibration of the model. In Section 7, we present and discuss our quantitative results. In
Section 8, compare model output with reduced from exercises in the data. In Section 9, we present
results from sensitivity exercises. Finally, in Section 10 we conclude.
2 Related Literature
Gains from new transportation infrastructure We contribute to the literature that analy-
zes the income gains from new transportation infrastructure using general equilibrium models of
trade. Papers in this area include Adamopoulos (2011), Donaldson (Forthcoming), Donaldson and
Hornbeck (2016), Herrendorf, Schmitz, and Teixeira (2012), Gollin and Rogerson (2014), Redding
and Turner (2015). There are contemporaneous works that also investigate the effects of internal
trade barriers in India. Alder (2017) estimates the effect of the GQ on Indian districts using
satellite data on night lights and finds significant increases in economic activity across regions.
Van Leemput (2015) builds a multi-sector model in which both internal and international trade
are present. She finds that reducing internal trade costs would generate welfare gains considerably
larger than that of lifting all international trade barriers.
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Our paper is the first to quantitatively study the effects of new transportation infrastructure
on allocative efficiency. The existing work in this literature typically uses an Eaton and Kortum
(2002) model. In that model, or in any of the other workhorse models considered by Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), there is no scope for gains from allocative efficiency.2 Our
results show that improvements in allocative efficiency can be an important channel of income
gains.
Identification of transportation costs within a country We extend the existing metho-
dologies to identify transportation costs in the existing literature by relaxing the assumption of
perfect competition. To do so, we apply the two-step procedure used by Donaldson (Forthcoming).
He uses data of products produced in only one location to identify transportation costs and the
parameter governing the trade elasticity in his model. This two-step procedure is useful since it
is a way of disciplining parameters of the model in a setting in which aggregate trade flows across
regions are not observed. We show that this procedure is consistent with a model of oligopolistic
competition when applied to monopolistic producers. Thus, by exploiting our plant level data set,
we can identify both transportation costs and the elasticity of substitution across sectors using a
gravity approach.
Our identification of transportation costs is also methodologically related to Atkin and Donald-
son (2015). In their paper, the authors highlight three challenges faced by the literature that uses
price differences across space to identify transportation costs. First, price differences can reflect
unobserved product characteristics across locations, such as quality. We attempt to control for
this by using very narrowly defined products (around 5,000). Furthermore, we have specifications
in which we attempt to control for destination characteristics that could influence unobserved
product characteristics, such as average income. In contrast, Atkin and Donaldson (2015) rely
on data at the bar code level, which provides them with information on products more narrowly
defined. For instance, in our case, a product would be “Coffee bean, green (raw)”. In their case, a
product would be “Ground And Whole Bean Coffee - Folgers Classic Roast”.
The second challenge is that, even in a setting with perfect competition, only price differences
between two locations that trade a product are useful in identifying transportation costs. Thus, it
is important to know which location pairs are trading, which is often hard to determine. We tackle
this problem by using the production information in plant-level data to identify national monopo-
lists using narrowly defined products. We complement this information with data on intermediate
input usage to determine where the products are used. These two pieces of information allow us
to pin down the origin and destination of the product. In contrast, Atkin and Donaldson (2015)
2A notable exception is the framework used in Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (Forthcoming),
where reductions in transportation costs can improve efficiency in the allocation of labor across sectors and regions.
carry out phone interviews with firms to determine the origin of products.
The third challenge is that, even if we know the origin and destination of a product, the price
differences contain both transportation costs and markups. To overcome this challenge, we use
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a result from our model that implies that national monopolists have the same markup across
destinations. Thus, the differences in prices charged by monopolists across destinations reveal
transportation costs. On the other hand, Atkin and Donaldson (2015) focus on an environment
in which markups may depend on transportation costs. They show that, in a general oligopolistic
model with very flexible preferences, pass through rates across locations are a sufficient statistic of
the reaction of markups to changes in transportation costs. They then estimate these pass-through
rates and use them to “correct” for markups in the observed price differences.
Misallocation Our paper also contributes to the recent literature that emphasizes misallocation
of resources across firms as one of the main sources of TFP differences across countries. In their
influential paper, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that wedges between the marginal products of
factors may account for up to 60% of the TFP gap between India and the United States. Other
papers in this literature include Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and
Scarpetta (2013), and Peters (2013).
We quantitatively study the effects of a policy that took place instead of a counterfactual that
removes all misallocation in the economy.3 The construction of the GQ provides a quasi-natural
experiment, which allows us to check that the main mechanisms of the model are present in the
data.
Pro-competitive gains in international trade Lastly, this paper contributes to the active
debate in international trade relating to the size of pro-competitive gains. Gains in allocative effi-
ciency are equivalent to pro-competitive gains since they are due to changing markups. Prominent
papers in this large literature include Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodríguez-Clare (Fort-
hcoming), de Blas and Russ (2015), Dhingra and Morrow (Forthcoming), Edmond, Midrigan, and
Xu (2015), Epifani and Gancia (2011), Feenstra (2014), Feenstra and Weinstein (Forthcoming),
Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014).4 The most closely related paper to ours is that of Edmond, Midri-
gan, and Xu (2015). The authors use an Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model to study the size of
pro-competitive gains in a context in which Taiwan trades with the rest of the world.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to quantitatively study the size of pro-
3Our paper is not the first in quantifying the income effects of a specific distortion. Some examples are Gourio
and Roys (2014), Garicano, Lelarge, and Van-Reenen (2016), and Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008). Although not
studying the effects of an particular policy, David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2016) link misallocation to a
specific distortion, i.e., informational frictions, and quantify its effects on aggregate income and productivity.
4Workhorse international trade models with variable markups include: Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum
(2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
are not symmetric plays a key role in determining both the size and the distribution of pro-
competitive gains. First, pro-competitive gains are concentrated in states with low wages. Low
wages in those states imply that firms located there will be able to charge high markups. Second,
for some states, we find that changing wages can account for large fractions of the pro-competitive
gains.
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Finally, we find that a setting with a-symmetric economies plays an important role in another
determinant of income, which is related to the aggregate markup charged on exported goods
relative to those that are imported. This can be interpreted as the effect of markups on a state’s
terms of trade since it affects the price of exported vs. imported goods. We find that income
changes through this channel can be quantitatively important in some states.
3 Roads in India and the Golden Quadrilateral
India has the second largest road network in the world, spanning approximately 3.3 million kilo-
meters. It comprises expressways, national highways (79,243 km), state highways (131,899 km),
major district highways, and rural roads. Roads play an important role in facilitating trade in
India: approximately 65% of freight in terms of weight and 80% of passenger traffic are transported
on roads.5 National highways are critical since they facilitate interstate traffic and carry about
40% of the total road traffic.
At the end of the 1990s, India’s highway network left much to be desired. The major economic
centers were not linked by expressways, and only 4% of roads had four lanes. In addition to the
limited lane capacity, more than 25% of national highways were considered to be in poor surface
condition. Congestion was also an important issue, with 25% of roads categorized as congested.
This was due to poor road conditions, increased demand from growing traffic, and crowded urban
crossings. Frequent stops at state or municipal checkpoints for government procedures such as tax
collection or permit inspection also contributed to congestion (see World-Bank (2002)).
In order to improve this situation, the Indian government launched the National Highways
Development Project (NHDP) in 2001. The goal of the initiative was to improve the performance
of the national highway network. The first phase of the project involved the construction of the
Golden Quadrilateral (GQ), a 5,800 km highway connecting the four major metropolitan areas via
four and six-lane roads. The four metropolitan centers that were connected are Delhi, Mumbai,
Chennai, and Calcutta. Apart from the increase in the number of lanes, additional features of
a high-quality highway system were constructed. These features include grade separators, over-
bridges, bypasses, and underpasses.
The cost was initially projected to be 600 billion rupees (equivalent to $13.4 billion in 2006).
5The importance of railroads has declined in India over time. Although in 1950 more than 80% of freight
traveled by rail, this figure has steadily been decreasing. At present, rail carries mostly bulk freight such as iron,
steel, and cement. Non-bulk freight represents only around 3% of total rail freight in terms of ton-km.
As of October 2013, the total cost incurred by the Indian government was approximately half of
the projected sum (250 billion rupees or $5.6 billion). In Section 7, we compare this cost with the
benefits predicted by our model.
The second phase of the NHDP consists in the construction of the North-South and East-West
corridor, a highway that aims to connect Srinagar in the north to Kanyakumari in the south and,
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Silchar in the east to Porbandar in the west. Although this second phase was approved in 2003,
there have been many delays for its construction, and less than 10% of the work was completed
by the end of 2006. Thus, we will not consider that project in our analysis.
Geospatial data We have geospatial data for all the National Highways of India, which was
supplied by ML Infomap. We complement this data using information provided by the National
Highways Authority of India (NHAI) on the completion dates of various portions of the GQ. The
GQ consisted of 127 stretches and we have detailed information about the start and end points.6
Figure I shows the evolution of the GQ (in red) in 2001 and 2006. Although the GQ was finished
in 2013, more than 90% of the project was completed by 2006. We will link this geospatial data
to manufacturing data for 2001 and 2006.
Figure I
Road Network in India and the GQ
A: GQ construction in 2001 B: GQ construction in 2006
Panel A of Figure I shows a map with the road network in India at the end of 2001, including the sections of the
Golden Quadrilateral that were finished by then (approximately 10% of the total project). Panel B shows the same
map but for 2006 (approximately 95% of the total project).
6See nhai.org/completed.asp and the Annual Reports of NHAI.
4 Model
In this section, we present our static general equilibrium model of internal trade based on Atkeson
and Burstein (2008). This model has been used to study firm pricing under strategic comple-
mentarities in international trade (see for instance Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2016)). This
model has CES demand while also generating variable markups by departing from monopolistic
competition. This is particularly convenient for us since, as we will show in Section 6, the CES
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demand structure of the model gives convenient expressions for estimating transportation costs
and the elasticity of substitution across sectors.
We consider N asymmetric states trading with each other. In each state, there is a measure 1
of sectors. Within each sector, there is a finite number of firms that compete in an oligopolistic
manner. Labor is immobile across states.7
4.1 Consumers
In each state n, there is a representative household with a utility function:
Cn =
(∫ 1
0
Cn(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
, (1)
where Cn(j) is the composite good of sector j and θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across
composite goods of different sectors. The sector-level composite good is defined as:
Cn(j) =
⎛
⎝ N∑
o=1
Koj∑
k=1
con(j, k)
γ−1
γ
⎞
⎠
γ
γ−1
, (2)
where con(j, k) is the good consumed by state n and provided by firm k in sector j shipped from
state o, N is the number of states, Koj is the number of firms that operate in sector j in state o,
and γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced by different firms in the same
sector. We assume that γ > θ, which means that goods are more substitutable within sectors than
between sectors.
The budget constraint of the representative household in state n is given by:
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
o=1
Koj∑
k=1
pon(j, k)con(j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj = WnLn + Πn, (3)
where Wn is the equilibrium wage, Ln is the labor endowment, and Πn is the income derived from
the profits of firms located in n.
7We do not find evidence that the construction of the GQ induced movements of labor across states in India.
See Section 9 for a full discussion of this topic.
4.2 Firms
In each sector j in state o, there is a finite number of Koj firms. Firms draw their productivity from
a distribution with CDF G(a). A firm with a productivity level a has a constant labor requirement
of 1/a to produce one unit of good. Because firms do not pay a fixed cost to operate in a market,
they sell to all N states.
To determine the firm’s pricing rule, we first find the demand it faces. Equations (1), (2), and
(3) generate the demand:
θ
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con(j, k) =
(
Pn
Pn(j)
)θ (
Pn(j)
pon(j, k)
)γ
Cn, (4)
where
Pn(j) =
⎛
⎝ N∑
o=1
Koj∑
k=1
pon(j, k)1−γ
⎞
⎠
1
1−γ
(5)
is the price index for sector j in state n and
Pn =
(∫ 1
0
Pn(j)1−θdj
) 1
1−θ
(6)
is the aggregate price index in state n. Intuitively, the relative demand for a differentiated good
within a sector depends on the price of the good relative to the price of the composite good of the
sector, and also on the price of the composite good of the sector relative to the aggregate price
index.
Firms within sectors compete à la Cournot. Firm k located in state o selling to state d takes
the demand characterized by equation (4) and the quantity supplied by competitor firms in the
sector as given and solves the following problem:
πod(j, k) = max
co
d
(j,k)
pod(j, k)cod(j, k) −
Woτ
o
d
ao(j, k)
cod(j, k), (7)
where ao(j, k) is the productivity of firm k in sector j producing in state o, τ od is the iceberg
transportation cost to ship one unit of good from o to d. Note that, because of the constant
returns to scale technology, the problem of a firm across all different destinations can be solved
independently. The solution to this problem is:
pod(j, k) =
od(j, k)
od(j, k) − 1
Wo
ao(j, k)
τ od , (8)
where
od(j, k) =
(
ωod(j, k)
1
θ
+ (1 − ωod(j, k))
1
γ
)−1
, (9)
and ωod(k, j) is the market share of firm k producing in state o in sector j selling to state d:
ωod(j, k) =
pod(j, k)cod(j, k)∑N
o=1
∑Koj
k=1 p
o
d(j, k)cod(j, k)
. (10)
The price that firms set in equation (8) is similar to the markup over marginal cost that is found
in a setup with monopolistic competition. The difference is that the markups are endogenous here,
and depend on the market structure of the sector. For example, suppose that there is only one
firm in a given sector, then that firm will compete only with firms operating in other sectors and
its demand elasticity will be equal to θ. This means that the firm faces the sector-level elasticity
of demand. At the other extreme, suppose that a firm’s market share is close to zero, then the
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firm will compete only with firms in its own sector and its elasticity of demand will be equal to
γ. Notice that a given firm will generally have different market shares and hence charge different
markups across different destinations.
The aggregate profits of firms in state n are characterized by:
Πn =
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
d=1
Knj∑
k=1
πnd (j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj. (11)
4.3 Balanced Trade and Labor-Clearing Condition
All states n must have balanced trade:
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
o=1, o=n
Koj∑
k=1
pon(j, k)con(j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj = ∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
d=1, d=n
Knj∑
k=1
pnd(j, k)cnd(j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj. (12)
The labor-clearing condition for state n is:
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
d=1
Knj∑
k=1
cnd(j, k)
an(j, k)
τnd
⎞
⎠ dj = Ln. (13)
4.4 Definition of Equilibrium
Equilibrium. For all states n and n′, sectors j, and firms knj, an equilibrium is a set of allocations of
consumption goods {cnn′(j, k), Cn(j)}, firm prices {pnn′(j, k)}, sector prices {Pn(j)}, and aggregate
variables {Wn, Pn, Πn} such that:
1. Given firm prices, sector prices, and aggregate variables, {cnn′(j, k)} is given by (4), Cn(j) by
(2), and they solve the consumer’s problem in (1), and (3).
2. Given aggregate variables, pnn′(j, k) is given by (8), (9), and (10), and solves the problem of
the firm in (7).
3. Aggregate profits satisfy (11), aggregate prices satisfy (6), and sector prices satisfy (5).
4. Trade flows satisfy (12).
5. Labor markets satisfy (13).
8Note that this is equivalent to the TFPR measure in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) since labor is the only factor of
production.
4.5 Misallocation in the Model
Misallocation in this setting arises due to dispersion in markups across producers. We can show
that the revenue productivity of a firm operating in state o and selling to destination d, defined as
TFPRod(j, k) = pod(j, k)ao(j, k), is Woτ od od(j, k)/ (od(j, k) − 1).8 Thus, conditonal on transportation
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costs, firms with high productivity draws (and high markups) also have a high revenue producti-
vity. Firms with high productivity draws are smaller in size than they would be in the case of
perfect competition. Thus, India’s welfare would increase by reallocating labor from firms with
low productivity draws (low-markup firms) to firms with high productivity draws (high-markup
firms). This type of misallocation has already been emphasized by Peters (2013) and by Epifani
and Gancia (2011) (at the level of industries).
Other papers in the literature often interpret this misallocation as resulting from government
policies that create idiosyncratic distortions at the firm level, which affect the optimal decision of
firms. In the particular case in which these idiosyncratic distortions are positively correlated with
firm size, the misallocation studied in those papers is similar in nature to the one predicted by our
model.
4.6 A Framework to Decompose the Effects of the GQ
We can apply the framework developed by Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) (HHL) to decompose the
changes in real income in our model in a way that highlights the various mechanisms at work.
The framework allows us in particular to distinguish between Ricardian, allocative efficiency, and
markups terms of trade effects from lowering transportation costs.
We now introduce some notation for the purpose of the decomposition. First, we define the
aggregate markups on the goods sold. This reflects how much market power firms producing in a
state have when selling to other states. First, the revenue-weighted mean labor cost share for the
products sold by state n is:
cselln =
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
d=1
Knj∑
k=1
cselln,d (j, k)snd(j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj,
where cselln,d (j, k) is the labor cost share of goods produced by firm k in sector j and sold in state d
and snd(j, k) is the share of state n’s revenue that comes from selling those goods. The aggregate
markup on the goods sold can be expressed:
μselln =
Rn
WnLn
= 1
cselln
,
where Rn = WnLn + Πn, which is the state’s total revenue. Note that there is an analogous
expression at the firm level which is that the firm’s markup is equal to the reciprocal of the labor
share.
We next define the aggregate markups on the goods purchased by state n, which reflect how
much market power firms located in other states have when selling to state n. The revenue-weighted
mean labor cost for the products purchased by state n is:
cbuyn =
∫ 1
0
⎛
⎝ N∑
o=1
Koj∑
k=1
cbuyo,n (j, k)bon(j, k)
⎞
⎠ dj.
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9It can be shown that this term is equal to the cost of one unit of utility under marginal cost pricing divided
by the cost of acquiring one unit of utility with the equilibrium bundle under marginal cost pricing.
10Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (Forthcoming) also present a decomposition of real income for a
model of internal trade that deviates from the formula presented by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).
Our decomposition allows for changes in real income in a given region being affected by changes in markups. Their
decomposition allows for real income in a given region being affected by selection effects in intermediate goods
production, the cost of labor relative to other inputs, and changes in the returns of land and structures at the
aggregate level.
where cbuyo,n (j, k) is the labor cost share of goods produced by firm k in sector j located in state o
and bon(j, k) is the share of expenditures in state n on those goods. The aggregate markups on the
goods purchased are:
μbuyn =
1
cbuyn
.
Lastly, let P pcn be the aggregate price of state n if every firm engages in marginal cost pricing,
which is the aggregate price index that would emerge in a context of perfect competition. This
price index depends on the factors that determine the marginal cost of firms: the distribution of
firm productivity, the wages paid by firms, and the transportation costs that these firms face.
Using this notation, the real income in state n can be rewritten into the following components:
Yn = WnLn︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∗ 1P pcn︸︷︷︸ ∗
μselln
μbuyn︸ ︷︷ ︸ ∗
P pcn
Pn
μbuyn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor income Prod. efficiency Markup ToT Allocative efficiency
, (14)
where Yn = (WnLn + Πn) /Pn. The first component is the aggregate labor income. The second
component is the productive efficiency component of welfare. This component is simply the inverse
of the price index if all firms charged the marginal cost. The third component is the markups terms
of trade. This component compares the aggregate markups charged for the goods a state sells with
those that it purchases. The last component is allocative efficiency. This term is related to the
welfare loss that arises due to the dispersion in markups, which results in misallocation. In a
situation in which there is no variations on markups, or when there is no misallocation, this index
is equal to one. As misallocation increases, this index decreases.9
Combining the first two terms leads to an expression that is equal to real income if firms charge
their marginal cost. This expression maps back to welfare in the large class of models considered by
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), in which the markups of firms remain unchanged.
Thus, we consider changes in this component to be Ricardian effects.10 Given the expression in
equation (14), we decompose the changes in real income into the following terms:
Δ ln Yn = Δ lnWnLn + Δ ln
1
P pcn︸ ︷︷ ︸ + Δ ln
μselln
μbuyn︸ ︷︷ ︸ + Δ ln
P pcn
Pn
μbuyn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ricardian Markup ToT Allocative efficiency
.
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5 Manufacturing Plant-Level Data
We use plant-level data on the Indian manufacturing sector together with geospatial data to obtain
information that allows us to discipline the main parameters of the model. In particular, as we
explain in Section 6.1, we rely on goods that are produced by monopolists and used by other plants
as intermediate goods. We do so for two snapshots in time (2001 and 2006). It is important to
note that, to the best of our knowledge, inter-state trade data on goods transported by road is not
collected in India. Hence, throughout our analysis, we do not use any direct information on trade
flows across Indian regions.
5.1 Annual Survey of Industries and National Sample Survey
We first construct a representative sample of the Indian manufacturing sector. To do so, we merge
two separate sets of plant-level data: the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the National
Sample Survey (NSS). The ASI targets plants that are in the formal sector. It is the main source
of manufacturing statistics in India and has been commonly used in the development literature.11
It covers plants that have more than 10 workers if they have electricity and 20 if they do not. The
information provided by the establishments is very rich, covering several operational characteristics
such as sales, employment, wage bill, capital stock, and intermediate goods usage. The NSS
covers all informal establishments in the Indian manufacturing sector. “Informal” refers to all
manufacturing enterprises not included in the ASI. The process of merging the ASI and NSS data
is straightforward since very similar questions are used to collect both sets of data. For the year
2005-06 the final dataset contains 17 million manufacturing plants that employ 45 million workers
once the observation weights are used. According to the Indian Labor Force Survey, 46 million
workers were employed in the manufacturing sector that year.12
It is important to note the huge differences in productivity between formal and informal plants.
Informal plants account for approximately 80% of employment and only 20% of value added. Thus,
it is crucial to merge these data sets to have an accurate picture of the Indian manufacturing sector.
11See for instance Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti (2005), Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti
(2008), Chari (2011), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013).
12This is consistent with Hsieh and Klenow (2014), which is an example of another paper that jointly uses the
ASI and NSS datasets.
5.2 Prices and the Use of Intermediates in ASI-NSS
The ASI and NSS data contain detailed information about production and intermediate inputs
usage. For each plant in our data, we observe the value and physical quantity of production and
intermediate goods usage broken down by product. This means that we can compute the input
prices paid by plants, which allows us to identify transportation costs.13 To compute the price of
inputs, we divide the expenditure on a particular good by physical units.
13Although the ASI and NSS datasets have been previously used, not much attention has been paid to the pricing
information. A notable exception is Kothari (2014).
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The product classification used in both the ASI and NSS is the Annual Survey of Industries
Commodities Classification (ASICC). The ASICC contains approximately 5,400 different products,
which are very narrowly defined. For instance, the ASICC distinguishes between different types of
black tea such as leaf, raw, blended, unblended, and dust. In the processed mineral category, the
ASICC distinguishes between 12 different types of coke.
6 Inferring Parameter Values
We calibrate our model to 2006, when the GQ was already in place. Our calibration strategy is as
follows. Our model is characterized by (i) a set of bilateral iceberg costs between states (a 29 by
29 matrix of iceberg costs), (ii) the elasticity of substitution across sectors θ, (iii) the elasticity of
substitution within sectors γ, (iv) the number of producers in state i and sector j Kij, (v) the labor
endowment of states, and (vi) the parameters governing the productivity distribution of firms.
Using structural equations from the model, we first estimate the transportation costs and the
two elasticities (Sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5). We next plug into the model the number of firms
per state-sector that we observe in the data, and calibrate the labor endowment of the states and
the productivity distribution to match the relevant statistics of the Indian manufacturing sector
(Section 6.6).
6.1 Estimating Transportation Costs
The first step is to infer transportation costs. As mentioned before, the main limitation that we
face is the lack of direct information on trade flows of manufacturing goods across Indian regions.
To overcome this limitation, we use pricing data from intermediate inputs used across India as
described in Section 5.2, together with theoretical results from the model. Equation (8) shows
that the prices charged by firms depend both on transportation costs and on firms’ market shares
in the destination market. In order to identify transportation costs, we exploit one implication
of the model: variations in prices for nation-wide monopolists are due solely to variations in
transportation costs across destinations. To see this formally, equation (8) and the fact that a
monopolist has a market share of one in all destinations imply that the firm will charge:
pod(j, k) =
θ
θ − 1
Wo
ao(j, k)
τ od . (15)
Then, the relative price across destinations is:
pod(j, k)
pod′(j, k)
= τ
o
d
τ od′
,
which only depends on the ratio of transportation costs. Hence, through the lens of our model,
the prices charged by monopolists across destinations reveal differences in transportation costs.
Empirically, we define a monopolist as a plant selling at least 95% of the value of a given 5-digit
ASICC product nationally. Using the ASI and NSS for the years 2001 and 2006, we identify 165
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products that are manufactured by monopolists. The largest category is “Manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products,” which contains around 40% of the identified products. This is consistent
with the nature of the chemical industry, in which production is often concentrated in one plant
due to economies of scale, with the product then shipped to many locations.14
Once the products manufactured by monopolists are identified, we use the price paid for in-
termediate inputs in order to estimate equation (15). The strategy is similar to the one used
by Donaldson (Forthcoming), except we work with plant-level data and with a framework that
accommodates oligopolistic competition. In our empirical specification, we parametrize τ od with
effective distance. This measure computes the least cost path to travel from origin to destination,
taking the road network and the variation in road quality into account.
In order to compute effective distance, we first convert the national highway network into a
graph. The graph consists of a series of nodes that are connected by arcs. In our case, a node is
the most populous city in each district and an arc is the road that connects these cities. An arc
is referred to as being GQ or non-GQ depending on whether it was completed in a specific year.
Each road segment is assigned a cost:
Effective Distancen1n2 = Road Distance
n1
n2 if GQ = 0 (16)
Effective Distancen1n2 = αRoad Distance
n1
n2 if GQ = 1,
where n1 and n2 are nodes, and α indicates the effective distance of the GQ relative to stretches
of road that are not GQ. We use a value of α = 0.52, which is based on average speeds calculated
by the World Bank.15 We then use Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm to construct a matrix of
lowest-cost routes between all the districts for the years 2001 and 2006. The sets of bilateral
14A description of the production structure of the chemical industry in India can be found at
http://smallb.in/sites/default/files/knowledge_base/reports/IndianChemicalIndustry.pdf
15The value of α is based on the fact that the average speed on a national highway is between 30 and 40 km/h
according to World-Bank (2002). By contrast, the average speed on the GQ is estimated to be around 75 km/h.
This can be computed by calculating the predicted average speed while traveling from a random sample of origins
to a random sample of destinations over GQ roads using Google Maps (see Alder (2017)).
effective distances in these two years are different since the algorithm internalizes the fact that
traveling on a better quality road, that is completed stretches of the Golden Quadrilateral, is less
costly.
We take equation (15) to the data by regressing prices on our measures of effective distance. We
use a flexible specification of effective distance in order to capture non-linearities in transportation
costs. Such a flexible specification is commonly used to estimate the parameters of trade models
using gravity equations, such as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). We estimate equation (15) as
follows:
log pod,t(j) =
10∑
=1
βI{Effective Distanceod,t ∈ decile 
} +
∑
o,t
δo,t +
∑
j,t
αj,t + od,t(j), (17)
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where pod(j) is the weighted average of the prices paid by plants in district d in year t for the
intermediate input j produced by a monopolist located in district o, I is an indicator function that
takes value 1 if the condition within brackets is satisfied, δo,t are district of origin fixed effects that
vary by year, αj,t are product fixed effects that vary by year, and od,t(j) is the error term. The
origin fixed effects control for local wages and the product fixed effects control for firm productivity.
Note that origin and product fixed effects are time dependent, which implies that the identification
comes from the cross-sectional variation. We estimate equation (17) at the district level instead
of the state level, in order to exploit all possible variation in the data.16
Table I presents the results from estimating equation (17). Column (1) uses data from 2001
and 2006, whereas column (2) only uses data from 2006. We use column (1) as our baseline
specification. In both cases, we find that prices increase significantly over long distances. For
example, prices are 51% higher in the 10th decile than in the 1st decile. The 10th decile includes
districts located more than 1,800 kilometers away in effective distance, which is approximately the
road distance from New York City to Des Moines, Iowa.
Although the overall pattern is that prices increase over long distances, the estimates are non-
monotonic over shorter distances. For example, in column (1), the coefficient associated with the
third decile is 7 percentage points lower than the coefficient in the second decile. In order to avoid
having non-monotonic transportation costs in the model, we assume that the relationship between
iceberg costs and effective distance is given by a discrete monotonically increasing cubic function
g(Decileod), where Decileod indicates the corresponding decile between o and d. We first normalize
iceberg costs in the first decile to 1. The resulting iceberg costs from the regression are:
τˆ od = e
βˆDecileo
d (18)
Panel A of Figure III shows a map of the transportation costs from the district of New Delhi
(located in the National Capital Territory of Delhi). The legend on the map shows transportation
costs divided into quartiles. The figure also shows that only a small portion of the GQ had been
upgraded by this point (depicted in red). The first thing to notice is the concentric circles around
New Delhi. This means that the further the destination, the higher the transportation costs. These
16In order to avoid noisy estimates, we clean the data in several dimensions. First, we exclude input items
whose description refers to “other” or “non elsewhere classified” products. Second, we exclude goods that are not
consumed in at least five districts. Finally, we identify unit misreporting in several goods, which generates large
jumps in prices. See the Online Appendix for more details.
We then find the parameters of the cubic polynomial g(Decileod) that best fit the iceberg costs
characterized by equation (18).
In Figure II, we plot both sets of iceberg costs. The smoothed iceberg costs indicate that there
are indeed significant non-convexities with respect to effective distance. For example, we find that
there is an initial sharp increase between deciles 1 and 2. Then, there is a subsequent flattening
out starting in the third decile. Lastly, we see another large increase in deciles 9 and 10.
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circles also show that straight-line distances are highly correlated with the shortest path on the
highway system. The reason is that the highway system is dense, as can be seen in Figure I. Next,
we look at transportation costs in the year 2006 (Panel B of Figure III), after significant portions
of the upgrade of the GQ had been completed. The color categories for the map have not changed
compared to Panel A, so that the colors are comparable across maps. The lighter colors reflect a
general decrease in transportation costs.
6.2 Possible shortcomings and additional checks
In this subsection, we discuss possible shortcomings of our methodology to measure transportation
costs within India. In the cases in which it is feasible, we also assess whether these concerns may
Figure II
Smoothed Iceberg Costs using ASI-NSS
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Figure II shows the transportation costs implied by the estimated coefficients of column (1) of Table I - “ASI-NSS
Reg.” and a monotonic cubic function that best fits the estimated coefficients - “ASI-NSS Reg. (smooth)”. This is
g(xod) = 0.9+0.176xod −0.0317(xod)2+0.002(xod)3, where xod is a discrete variable that indicates the decile of effective
distance.
be empirically relevant in our case.
Unobserved variation in product quality When estimating equation (17), it is important
to consider whether there are unobserved factors that could be correlated with both distance and
reported price. If monopolists in the data are concentrated in a few places, it could be the case
that destination markets that are far away could have characteristics that generate higher/lower
prices. For example, further destinations could be associated to higher quality products and hence
higher prices which are unrelated to transportation costs.
For our specification, the ideal would be to have sellers (monopolist producers) and buyers
(plants that report using a monopolist product) located in various parts of the country. Thus,
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Figure III
Estimated Transportation Costs from Delhi
A: 2001 (District level)
Legend
1.000000 - 1.220800
1.220801 - 1.266400
1.266401 - 1.324800
1.324801 - 1.426000
B: 2006 (District level)
Legend
1.000000 - 1.220800
1.220801 - 1.266400
1.266401 - 1.324800
1.324801 - 1.426000
C: 2001 (State level)
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Madhya Pradesh
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Andhra Pradesh
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Uttaranchal
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Arunachal Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Manipur
Mizoram
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Tripura
Sikkim
Goa
Legend
1.034132 - 1.196764
1.196765 - 1.261991
1.261992 - 1.393191
1.393192 - 1.426000
D: 2006 (State level)
Rajasthan
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Bihar
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Karnataka
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Tamil Nadu
Chhattisgarh
Punjab
Jharkhand
Jammu and Kashmir
Haryana
Uttaranchal
Meghalaya
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Kerala
Arunachal Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Manipur
Mizoram
Nagaland
Tripura
Sikkim
Goa
Legend
1.026191 - 1.196764
1.196765 - 1.261991
1.261992 - 1.393191
1.393192 - 1.426000
Panel A of Figure III shows the estimated transportation costs from Delhi at the district level for 2001; Panel B
shows the estimated transportation costs from New Delhi at the district level for 2006; Panel C shows the estimated
transportation costs from Delhi at the state level for 2001; Panel D shows the estimated transportation costs from
Delhi at the state level for 2006. The transportation costs have been estimated as explained in Section 6.1.
the likelihood that there are unobservable characteristics systematically correlated with distance
would be reduced. In Figure IV, we show a map of the location of all monopolist producers (Panel
A) and the plants that utilize the products produced by the monopolists (Panel B). Reassuringly,
we find that they are highly spread out geographically. As an additional check, we estimate a
specification in which we include per capita income and average compensation per employee as
additional controls, none of which enter significantly into the estimation.
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Figure IV
Road Network in India and the GQ
A: Monopolist plants
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B: Plants that utilize monopolist products
"
" "
""
" "" ""
" "" " "
" ""
" "" ""
" ""
""""
" "" "
"""
"" """
"" ""
"
"
"" "" "
"
"" "
" "
""
""
" " """
" "" "
" """
" "" "
" "
""""
"
"" " "
" "
" """ "
" "
" "" "" "
"" "
" "" " """"
" "" "
" "" ""
" " """
" """ "
""" """
"""" """ "
"""""" "
""" " """ "" ""
"" """"" "
" """ ""
" "" "
"" "" "
" " "" """
""" ""
" "" """" ""
"" " """ "" " "
" "" "" """
" "" """ "" "
"" "" " """ """ "" "
"" "" "" "
""" "" " "
""" """
"""" ""
"" "
" """
""" "
"" "" ""
" "" "
"""" "
" "" "
" """"" "
""" "" "
"" "
" " ""
"""
" ""
" ""
""
""
"
""
"
"""
"
Panel A of Figure IV shows the location of monopolist plants. Panel B shows the location of plants that report
using a monopolist product.
Spatial price gaps may reflect variation in markups even for monopolists A theoretical
result which is crucial for our methodology is that markups charged by monopolists are constant
across destinations. The CES preference structure implies that monopolists face the same demand
elasticity across destinations independently on their marginal cost, which vary across destinations
due to different transportation costs. However, it could be the case that markups depend on
transportation costs. For example, consumers could have different elasticities at different levels of
prices. In that case, our estimates would be biased. In particular, if monopolists charge higher
markups in further destinations (the elasticity of demand is lower at higher prices), we would be
overestimating the size of transportation costs. In contrast, if monopolists charge lower markups
in more remote destinations (the elasticity of demand is higher at higher prices), we would be
underestimating transportation costs. Atkin and Donaldson (2015) find evidence that is consistent
with the latter in Ethiopia and Nigeria.
Lack of direct information on origin-destination Given the structure of our model, we show
that transportation costs are identified using monopolist price gaps across destinations. However,
this result is only useful if we know the exact location of the seller (plant producing the product)
and the buyer (plant using the product). Since we do not have plant-to-plant transaction data,
we rely on the assumption that, once we identify that a product is produced by a monopolist in
the data, it has necessarily to be the case that all plants using that product are buying it from the
monopolist.
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Imported intermediate inputs A key consideration when estimating equation (8) is that
we have identified plants that are monopolists. One potential source of competition is that of
foreign plants. Thus, we check the robustness of our pricing regressions by excluding goods in
districts where monopolist producers may face foreign competition. To do so, we use the fact that
plants report domestic and foreign intermediate inputs separately. We exclude any observations
in districts where imports account for more than 5% of total input usage. This corresponds to
11% of the good-district observations. Excluding these observations yields a very similar profile
in the association between prices and effective distance. See the Section CAccounting for Foreign
Competition When Estimating Transportation Costsappendix.C of the Online Appendix for more
details.
Relying on a few set of products Our methodology crucially relies on goods that are produced
by monopolists, which could be a problem if transportation costs are different for other goods in
the economy. These differences may arise from differences in levels and differences in the elasticity
of transportation costs with respect to distance. Since we include product fixed effects in equation
(17), our estimates of β inform us about the relationship between distance and transportation
costs but do not reflect any differences in levels. As mentioned above, we normalize all goods to
have iceberg transportation costs of 1 in the first decile of effective distance, which means that
we assume the lowest possible transportation cost when shipping to the closest location for all
goods. A more problematic issue would be if the elasticity of transportation costs with respect
to distance for goods produced by monopolists was different from that of other goods. If this
slope is particularly steep for the goods we use in the estimation, we would be overestimating
transportation costs at further distances. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence in
the existing literature on across product/industry differences in how transportation costs increase
with distance.
Internal tariffs A possible limitation of our methodology is the fact that we do not consider
trade barriers across Indian regions that are different from transportation costs. If those additional
trade barriers systematically correlate with our measures of effective distance then our estimates
would be biased. There is indeed a number of regulations in India that make internal trade across
regions costly. Perhaps the most striking ones are the entry taxes, which regulated at the state
level and they act as internal trade tariffs. Crucially, these taxes do not have to be paid if goods
only “transit” through the state.17 However, it could still be the case that further destinations
in our sample are systematically associated to states with higher/lower entry taxes. As we have
17For instance, according to the The West Bengal Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2012, “...no
tax under this Act shall be levied, and accordingly the import value of goods shall not be included in turnover of
imports of a dealer or an importer other than a dealer, in respect of entry of specified goods dispatched, at the
time of entry into local area, directly to a place outside the State in the same form in which such goods have been
entered into the local area.”
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shown in Figure IV, we use multiple origins and destinations in our analysis, which makes that
possibility unlikely. To formally examine if this is the case, we have also estimated versions of
equation (17) in which we control for state of destination fixed effects, which should capture any
variation in prices paid at destination coming from differences in taxes across states. Column (3)
in Table I shows the results, which confirm that our estimates remain virtually unchanged after
controlling for state of destination fixed effects.
Comparison with direct measures of transportation prices We have assembled an additi-
onal data set on transportation costs in India. The data contains prices charged by GIR Logistics, a
large transportation logistics firm in India.18 In particular, we have collected and digitized pricing
quotes for transporting a shipping container of size 20 ft x 8 ft x 8.5 ft via truck for approximately
900,000 origin-destination city pairs in August 2014.
In order to compare the transportation costs implied by our estimates of equation (8) with
those charged by GIR Logistics we proceed as follows. First, we construct prices at the district
level by calculating the simple average across cities. We then select the same pairs of districts as
those used in column (1) in order to make the two sets of transportation costs comparable. After
that initial preparation of the data, we estimate the following regression:
log pod,GIR =
10∑
=1
β,GIRI{Effective Distanceod,2006 ∈ decile 
} +
∑
o
δo,GIR + od,GIR, (19)
where pod,GIR is the price charged by GIR Logistics to transport a container, δo,GIR is a set of origin
fixed effects, and od,GIR is an error term. The results of this regression can be found in column (4)
of Table I.
Note that the estimates of β,GIR cannot be compared to β in columns (1) to (3). The coefficient
β,GIR measures changes in transportation prices, whereas β measures changes in product prices
18For details, see http://www.girlogistics.in/road-transportation.htm
at the destination. Thus, we convert the transportation costs estimated with the GIR Logistics
data into iceberg costs. To do so, we use the following formula:
τ od,GIR =
V + pˆod,GIR
V
(20)
where τ od,GIR is the implied iceberg cost using the GIR Logistics data, V is the value of shipments,
and pˆod,GIR is the transportation cost estimate from equation (19). It is important to note that V
pins down the level of iceberg costs. For example, as the value of shipments increases, the level of
implied iceberg costs declines.
We now want to find V in a way that makes it comparable to the ASI-NSS data. First, we
pick a V and find τ od,GIR for all deciles using equation (20). We then divide the iceberg costs of all
deciles by the first one in order to normalize transportation costs. As mentioned previously, we
have normalized the first decile of iceberg costs to one in our analysis. We then find V such that
the average normalized iceberg costs across deciles is equal to that of the ASI-NSS data.
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The results of this exercise can be found in Figure V. In both cases, transportation costs
increase more than linearly starting in deciles 7 and 8.
Figure V
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Figure V compares the transportation costs estimated in our baseline case, “ASI-NSS Reg. (smooth),” with the
ones estimated in column (3) of Table I which are labeled “GIR logistics Reg.”
Predicted vs. actual transportation cost estimates in 2001 We now investigate the ability
of our empirical specification estimated using data from 2006 to predict transportation costs in
2001. We estimate equation (17) using log effective distance as the independent variable with data
from the year 2006. The results of this estimation can be found in column (5) of Table I. We
then regress the observed prices in 2001 on the predicted prices from the previous regression. The
results can be found in column (6). We find that the coefficient on the predicted price is 0.80,
indicating that the empirical model has strong predictive powers.
6.3 State-Level Transportation Costs
It is necessary to aggregate the district-to-district transportation costs to the state level since
the model that we simulate is based on interstate trade. We do so in two steps. In the first
step, we choose a district and find the average transportation cost to a destination state. This
process yields district-to-state transportation costs. In the second step, we obtain the state-to-
state transportation costs by finding the average over districts in the origin state. All averages are
weighted by population.
In Figure III, we map transportation costs from the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Panel
C shows transportation costs in 2001 where the legend colors reflect the quartile of each destination
state. Panel D shows transportation costs in 2006. We hold the legend categories fixed so that the
maps are comparable. The lighter colors in 2006 reflect declines in transportation costs from the
GQ. Figure VI shows the percentage decline in these transportation costs. States in the quartile
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with the largest declines tend to be far from Delhi and in a location that can utilize the GQ for
transportation between these locations. The states in the top quartile benefit from a decline of 4.9
to 13.1% in transportation costs. For the bottom quartile, this figure ranges from 0 to 0.3%.
6.4 Estimating the Across-Sector Elasticity of Substitution (θ)
The next step consists in estimating the elasticity of substitution across sectors. The identification
strategy is to compare the differences in the transportation costs of the goods produced by mono-
polists across destinations with the trade flows across these destinations. This strategy is similar
to that used by Donaldson (Forthcoming).
Formally, we derive a gravity equation implied by the model for the trade flows of monopolists.
Combining equations (4) and (15), we derive the following condition for the trade flow values:
log cod(j, k)pod(j, k) =(1 − θ) logWo + (θ − 1) log ao(j, k) + logP θd Yd (21)
+ (1 − θ) log τ od + (1 − θ) log
θ − 1
θ
.
The model predicts that higher transportation costs reduce trade flows, and the strength of this
relationship depends on the value of θ. The intuition behind this identification strategy is that if
small differences in transportation costs across destinations are associated with big differences in
trade flows, then the value of θ must be high (and vice versa). It is also important to note that
this straightforward relationship only holds when firms are monopolists.
We estimate equation (21) as follows:
log Salesod,t(j, k) = ζ log τˆ od,t +
∑
o,t
δo,t +
∑
j,t
αj,t +
∑
d,t
λd,t + od,t(j, k) (22)
where Salesod,t(j, k) is the value of sales of product j in year t consumed in district d and produced by
a monopolist located in district o, τˆ od,t is the predicted iceberg transportation cost found in Section
6.1, δo,t are district of origin dummies that vary by year, αj,t are product dummies that vary by
year, λd,t are district of destination dummies that vary by year, and od,t(j, k) is the error term.
The origin dummies control for local wages. The product dummies control for firm productivity.
The destination dummies control for market size and aggregate prices at the destination. As in
Section 6.1, this specification uses cross-sectional variation to identify parameters. Furthermore,
we estimate it at the district level in order to fully exploit the variation in the data.
Table II presents the results of estimating equation (22). Columns (1) to (3) show the coefficient
associated with the predicted transportation costs constructed from the coefficients of columns (1)
to (3) of Table I, respectively. We find that higher transportation costs are associated with lower
trade flows at statistically significant levels. Our estimates range from 0.78 to 0.99. Thus, a
10% increase in transportation costs is associated to a 8-10% decrease in trade flows. In column
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Figure VI
Percentage decline in transportation costs from Delhi
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Orissa
Bihar
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
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Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Tamil Nadu
Chhattisgarh
Punjab
Jharkhand
Jammu and Kashmir
Haryana
Uttaranchal
Meghalaya
West Bengal
Kerala
Arunachal Pradesh
Himachal Pradesh
Manipur
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Legend
0.000000 - 0.295960
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4.885397 - 13.127630
Figure VI shows the percentage decline in transportation costs from Delhi due to the construction of the GQ at the
state level.
(4) we assume that all variation in transportation infrastructure are translated into prices, which
means introducing effective distance directly into equation (22). We find that a 10% increase in
transportation costs is associated to a 2% decrease in trade flows. Given these estimates, we take a
value of 1.99 for θ as a benchmark, which is the most conservative one in terms of its implications
for the size of allocative efficiency gains.19
19We also assessed the sensitivity of the these results to different market share thresholds for the identification
of monopolistic producers. We found that restricting to producers with market shares between 90 and 94% would
yield an across-sector elasticity of substitution ranging from 1.86 to 1.99. Threshold levels above 95% produced
lower elasticities (of around 1.35) and less precise estimates.
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where LSo,t(j, k) and ωot (j, k) are the labor and sectoral shares respectively in state o, δo,t are
district of origin dummies that vary by year, αj,t are product dummies that vary by year, and
ot (j, k) is the error term. Note that γ will be given by θˆ/
(
1 + βˆθˆ
)
. In contrast to the estimation
of transportation costs and the elasticity of substitution across sectors, we estimate equation (24)
at the state level in order to maximize the number of products produced in one location.
We present the results in Table III. Columns (1) and (3) show the results when we include
only labor remuneration on the left-hand side of the equation, whereas in columns (2) and (4)
we also include capital remuneration on the left-hand side of the equation. This second type of
specification controls for across-firm variations in capital intensity. In columns (1) and (2), we
include the pool of observations for the years 2001 and 2006, and control for time-variant state
and product fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4), we only include observations for the year 2006.
We find a strong correlation between the labor shares and sectoral shares of firms in the data.
The point estimates are similar in magnitude across the four specifications, ranging from -0.34 to
-0.49. The implied values for γ in columns 1-4 are 6.17, 25.30, 10.67, and 107.38, respectively.
Note that small changes in β can lead to large changes in γ, given the functional form that relates
these two variables. We choose 10.67 as a benchmark, since it is the closest to the value used by
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015).
6.5 Estimating the Within-Sector Elasticity of Substitution (γ)
We now estimate the within-sector elasticity of substitution. To do so, we derive the following
condition from the model between a firm’s labor share and its sectoral share for a given destination:
Wol
o
d(j, k)
p˜od(j, k)cod(j, k)
= 1 − 1
γ
−
(
1
θ
− 1
γ
)
ωod(j, k) (23)
where p˜od(j, k) is the factory gate price of the good. This condition implies that firms with a
higher sectoral share at a destination have a lower labor share. The reason is that firms with
higher sectoral shares charge higher markups, which result in lower labor shares. See the Online
Appendix for more details.
In the data, we do not observe the market shares of firms by destination. However, a similar
condition can be derived for goods that are only produced in one state. The reason is that in
these sectors, the market shares of firms are constant across destinations. Empirically, we find
that approximately 12% of goods are produced only in one state. Using data from these plants
producing these products, we estimate equation (23) as follows:
LSo,t(j, k) = βωot (j, k) +
∑
o,t
δo,t +
∑
j,t
αj,t + ot (j, k) (24)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1816
6.6 Calibrating the Remaining Parameters
Labor endowment In order to measure differences in economic size across states, we compute
total value added in manufacturing for each state. To that end, we first compute value added for
each plant in our sample by subtracting expenditure in intermediate goods and materials from sales.
We then aggregate it up at the level of state using the provided sampling weights. We find large
differences in economic size across states. For example, Maharashtra (the largest state) accounts for
23% of Indian manufacturing value added, while Arunachal Pradesh (the smallest state) accounts
for only 0.01%. In order to capture these differences in the model, we first normalize the labor
endowment of Arunachal Pradesh to 1. We then set the labor endowments of each state, Ln, so
that the model matches the ratio of manufacturing value added observed in the data across states.
Note that in the model the total value added of a state n is defined by WnLn + Πn and that the
equilibrium value added of state n is positively related to Ln. Note also that in the baseline version
of the model, we do not consider productivity differences across states. Thus, a large state could
correspond to a state with a high Ln and low average productivity or, alternatively, a state with
a low Ln but high average productivity. These productivity differences could be incorporated by
assuming that there is a state-specific component in firms’ productivity. In Section 9, we show
that including a state-specific productivity component would affect the distribution of wages across
states but would not affect our quantitative results given that the distribution of markups does
not change.
Number of producers by state and sector The number of firms that operate in each state
is important to determine the nature of gains from lower transportation costs. To illustrate this
idea, consider a two-state example in which these two states go from autarky to trading with each
other. If firms in these two states produce in entirely different sectors, the effects from trade will
be purely Ricardian since markups will remain unchanged. However, if the two states produce
goods in the same sectors, then there may be effects on allocative efficiency.
We set the number of firms in sector j of state n, Knj, to match the number of plants observed
in the data. Since there are no fixed costs in the model, firms always choose to operate. Thus,
there is no entry and exit of firms after changes in transportation costs. Abstracting from firm
entry and exit in these kinds of models does not affect the final results quantitatively, as discussed
by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015). The reason is that
a reduction in transportation costs leads to the entry and exit of low-productivity firms, which
do not significantly affect the markups that large firms charge. Furthermore, the data does not
show significant changes in the number of firms operating in each state. For example, the auto-
correlation of the number of producers per sector-state between 2001 and 2006 is 0.98. We did
not see large changes in the number of active sectors either (average change of 3%), or in the total
number of firms (average change of 2%) by state over this period.
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Finally, in order to reduce the computational burden, we limit the number of firms operating in
each sector of a state to 50. This means that we set the maximum number of producers per sector
to 1,450 (29 x 50). In the data, there are 129,514 sector-state combinations. There are more than
50 firms operating in approximately 5,000 of these combinations. This means that the restriction
is binding in around 4% of the cases.
Productivity distribution We use a Pareto distribution for the productivity draws. The tail
parameter, α, is calibrated in equilibrium to match the fact that the top 5% of firms in manu-
facturing value added account for 89% of value added. In the sensitivity analysis (Section 9), we
discuss the inclusion of cross-state heterogeneity in productivity.
Within-sector productivity across states The correlation of firm productivity draws across
states is important to determine the size of allocative efficiency gains. The reason is that if firms
across states have a similar productivity, then there is a high degree of head-to-head competition.
Thus, lowering transportation costs will have a larger impact on the distribution of markups.
We assume that firms across states have perfectly correlated productivity draws. To implement
this, we first find the maximum number of plants present in any state for each sector. We make
this number of draws from a Pareto distribution. We then sort the productivities in descending
order. If a state has one firm, we select the first productivity on the sorted list. If a state has
ten firms, we select the first ten productivities on the sorted list. This setup ensures that the
firms with the highest productivity face head-to-head competition. Note that this does not imply
that the sectors are symmetric across states. The reason is that states have a different number of
operating firms. Furthermore, states have different wages and transportation costs, which affect
their marginal cost.
It is important to determine whether the model generates reasonable levels of head-to-head
competition given the assumption of perfectly correlated productivity draws. We create a “simila-
rity” index that measures the similarity in size among the largest firms across states. We focus on
the largest firms since they are the ones that drive most of the dispersion in markups as we will
show in Section 7. To calculate the index, for each sector and state we identify the firm with the
largest value added. Then, we regress the log of the value added of these firms on sector dummies.
The R squared of that regression, which we use as our index, indicates the extent to which large
firms in each sector are of similar size. For example, an R squared of one indicates that the largest
firms across states are exactly the same size. We find an index of 0.45 in the data and 0.51 in the
model. A similar picture emerges when we use employment as a measure of firm size. In that case,
we find a similarity index of 0.43 in the data and 0.46 in the model. This exercise indicates that
the model generates levels of head-to-head competition that are in line with the data.
Furthermore, we can check whether the trade elasticity implied by the model is consistent with
other estimates in the literature. More head-to-head competition implies a larger trade elasticity.
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The reason is that when producers in different locations have similar levels of productivity, small
changes in trade costs have larger effects on trade flows between states. We calculate the trade
elasticity implied by our model by estimating the following regression:
Sod = σ log τ od +
∑
o
δo +
∑
d
λd + od, (25)
where Sod is the bilateral trade from state o to d, σ is the trade elasticity, δo is a set of state-origin
fixed effects, and λd is a set of state-destination fixed effects. The trade elasticity implied by our
model is 4.71, which is similar to recent estimates found in the literature. For example, Head and
Mayer (2014) carry out a meta-analysis of empirical estimates of trade elasticity and find a median
estimate of 5.03. We will show in the sensitivity analysis that the case of non-correlated draws
cannot match the data in the two dimensions listed above.
6.7 Discussion of Markups
Distribution of markups faced by consumers Table IV summarizes the distribution of
markups charged to consumers in each state. We find an average markup of 1.11 in all destinations,
which is very close to the lowest possible markup of γ/(γ − 1). Furthermore, our results indicate
that the bulk of firms do not have enough market shares to charge significantly higher markups.
For example, even in the 95th percentile of the markup distribution, we do not see a large increase
in the minimum markup. Markups become significantly larger in the 99th percentile, which ranges
from 1.26 to 1.29 across states. There are two ingredients in the model that can explain this
markup distribution. First, we use a Pareto distribution for productivity draws. Second, the
model implies a convex relationship between sectoral shares and markups. Thus, the few firms
with large market shares also have the high markups.
Markups compared to empirical studies Empirical studies in industrial organization find
that the bulk of firms have modest markups and that a minority of firms have markups that are
significantly higher. For example, De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) estimate
the median markup by sector. They use the Prowess data set which covers medium to large Indian
firms. The authors find a median markup of 1.18 across sectors. They also find a mean markup of
2.24 across sectors indicating a skewness in the right tail of the markup distribution. De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) find similar results using data from Slovenian manufacturing. They find a
median markup of 1.17-1.28 across sectors depending on the specification. Furthermore, they find
a standard deviation of 0.50 across all specifications, also implying a skewness in the right tail of
the distribution.
Our calibrated model matches the fact that most firms have small markups and that a few
firms have very large markups. On the other hand, our model does not quantitatively capture the
high end of the markup distribution found in these empirical studies. For example, the highest
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possible markup that firms can charge in the model is θ/(θ − 1) or 2.01. In Section 9, we perform
a sensitivity analysis by lowering θ to allow for higher markups.
Where are the high markup firms located? An important dimension of the markup distri-
bution is related to the location of firms. In the model, firms located in large states have lower
marginal costs because of lower wages. For example, the 5 largest states have an average wage
of 0.45, where we have normalized the wage of the smallest state to 1. States ranked 10-20 and
25-29 in size have an average wage of 0.51 and 0.83, respectively. As a result, firms located in large
states tend to have a cost advantage and thus charge higher markups. Another implication is that
large states have lower levels of allocative efficiency. The reason is that, again, the local firms can
charge relatively high markups. The allocative efficiency index from equation (14) indicates a loss
in welfare of 2% to 3% across states due to a dispersion in markups, with the low states having
the highest losses due to poor allocative efficiency.
Figure VII shows the location of the firms whose markups on goods purchased in Arunachal
Pradesh (the smallest state) and Maharashtra (the largest state) are in the top 1%. Note that
the state of origin is ranked from largest to smallest. We see that, in both cases, firms with the
highest markups are primarily located in Maharashtra and other big states where wages tend to
be lower. For instance, around 50% of the firms charging the markups in the top 1% in the market
of Maharashtra are local firms.
7 Quantifying the Impact of the GQ
In this section, we quantify the aggregate and state-level effects of the construction of the GQ on
the Indian manufacturing sector. To this end, we compare the outcomes from our calibrated model
in 2006 with the outcomes when we remove the GQ. To remove the GQ, we use the estimates from
Section 6.1 to determine the changes in transportation costs. For illustrative purposes, we present
all the results as changes from before to after the construction of the GQ (2001 to 2006).
In order to quantify the effects of the GQ, we begin with our baseline calibration described
in Table V. We then feed the iceberg transportation costs in 2001 into the calibrated model. To
estimate these transportation costs, we first find the new effective distance between districts in
2001 by re-computing the shortest path between them taking into account the road network at the
time. We use these effective distances, along with estimates from equation (17), to find the new
iceberg transportation costs. Finally, we re-aggregate the district-to-district transportation costs
to state-to-state transportation costs as described in Section 6.3.
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7.1 Welfare Changes
First, we consider the aggregate change in real income resulting from the GQ. We find that real
income increased by 2.72% as shown in Table VI. In our quantitative exercise, we only consider
the manufacturing sector which had a value added of $152.8 billion in 2006 (around 16% of Indian
GDP). Thus, the static benefit from the GQ project is $4.2 billion. Note that these static benefits
accrue to the economy each year. At the same time, estimates indicate that the government spent
approximately $5.6 billion on this project. Thus, we find that the benefits over a two-year period
exceed the initial construction costs. For context of the size of the gains in relation to the size of
the national economy, we find that the gains comprise 0.44% (2.72%*16%) of national income.
The welfare effects of the GQ are heterogeneous across states. Table VI lists the welfare effects
across states in descending order of size. Overall, large states have gained more from the reduction
in transportation costs. Small states have seen modest gains and, in some cases, have even lost.
This is driven by the fact that, due to its placement, the GQ has lowered transportation costs
primarily for large states. Panel A of Figure VIII shows a map of the welfare effects across states.
Figure VII
Spatial distribution of the top 1% firms in terms of markups (Model)
(A) Firms selling to Arunachal Pradesh
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(B) Firms selling to Maharashtra
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Figure VII shows the distribution of states in which the top 1% of firms in terms of markups operate. Panel A refers
to the markups charged on goods sold in Arunachal Pradesh. Panel B refers to the markups charged on goods sold
in Maharashtra.
The map shows that most of the states that have lost are located in the Northeast, which are
the states located farthest from the GQ. The states in the Northeast that have experienced losses
include: Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. Finally, the state of
Chattisgarh has experienced a loss that is very close to zero.
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7.2 Decomposition of Welfare Changes
We use the Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) decomposition to break down the effect of the GQ on
changes in real income into Ricardian, markups terms of trade, and allocative efficiency effects.
Table VI shows these components at the aggregate and state level. Table VII shows the change in
these three components and Figure VIII shows the geographical distribution across India.
7.2.1 Allocative efficiency
We find that, for the manufacturing sector as a whole, the allocative efficiency component accounts
for 7.4% of the gains (0.20% of the 2.72% total gains). Lower transportation costs have generally
led to welfare-enhancing changes in markups since the allocative efficiency effects are positive
in all but four states. This quantitative result is informative since theory is ambiguous as to
whether declines in transportation costs lead to these types of gains. We find that these gains
are concentrated in the largest states. The average gain in allocative efficiency is 0.27% for the
five largest states and this number subsequently declines. The reason is that large states have low
levels of allocative efficiency since local firms tend to have the highest markups.
We report the results from two sets of exercises that serve to disentangle whether improvements
in allocative efficiency come from: 1) changing transportation costs, which are a direct effect of
the GQ, or 2) changing wages, which are the result of general equilibrium effects. In the first
exercise, we calculate the allocative efficiency index when we change transportation costs for only
one bilateral pair of states, while holding all other transportation costs and wages fixed. Given the
new transportation costs, we re-solve for the distribution of prices for all firms across destinations.
This information allows us to re-calculate the allocative efficiency index. Note that when we do
this exercise, we do not re-solve all of the aggregate variables in the model, which would result
in changing wages. Although this re-computed allocative efficiency index is not an equilibrium
outcome, it is useful in order to disentangle the direct effect of changing transportation costs from
the general equilibrium effects. The changes in allocative efficiency in this exercise are reported in
Table VIII. Each column indicates the state for which we report the percentage change in allocative
efficiency and each row indicates the state for which we change the transportation costs. Consider
the case of Chattisgarh, which is the median state in terms of size. The column for that state
indicates positive effects from reducing transportation costs to all but four states. Thus, we find
that transportation costs tend to have a positive effect. The reason is that local firms, which have
relatively high markups, must lower their markups when transportation costs decline. One notable
exception is the direct effect of Chattisgarh reducing transportation costs with Maharashtra. In
this case, this direct effect of lowering transportation costs is negative. The reason is that firms
located in Maharashtra have relatively high markups since wages in that state are low enough to
compensate for transportation costs.
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In the second exercise, we change wages in one state and hold all other wages and transportation
costs fixed. The changes in allocative efficiency are reported in Table IX. Each row indicates the
state for which we change wages and each column indicates the state for which we report the
percentage change in allocative efficiency. It is important to note that wages rose for states close
to the GQ. The reason is that the exports of these states became more competitive relative to
other states. Thus, wages must rise in order to satisfy the balanced trade condition. As before,
consider the case of Chattisgarh. Allocative efficiency rises if we let wages only in Chattisgarh rise
since local firms, which have relatively high markups, lower their markups. If we inspect the rest
of that column, we find that rising wages in other states negatively affects allocative efficiency in
Chattisgarh. One exception is the increase in wages in Maharashtra, which improves allocative
efficiency in Chattisgarh.
The last row of Table VIII shows the change in allocative efficiency in each state if we change
all transportation costs and hold wages fixed. The last row of Table IX indicates the change in
allocative efficiency if we change all wages and hold transportation costs fixed. Let’s come back
to the case of Chattisgarh. The change in allocative efficiency which comes from the direct effect
of changes in transportation costs is positive (0.047%). In contrast, the indirect effect implies
a negative change (-0.028%). This means that for the particular case of Chattisgarh, ignoring
the general equilibrium effects through wages would lead to overestimating the size of allocative
efficiency gains.
We find that the relative importance of the direct effect vs. indirect effect in explaining alloca-
tive efficiency gains varies across states. In particular, we find that the direct effect accounts for
the bulk of changes in allocative efficiency in big states. Consider the case of Maharashtra, which
as mentioned before is the largest state. In this case, the gains from changes in relative wages
are -0.065%, whose absolute value represents around 17% of the gains that come from the direct
effect. For the case of small states, however, the importance of the indirect effect is bigger. Take
for instance the case of Aruchanal Pradesh, which as mentioned before is the smallest state. In
this state, we find that the gain from the indirect effect (0.013%) is larger than the gain from the
direct effect.
7.2.2 Markups Terms of Trade
We find that welfare gains from changes in markups terms of trade are quantitatively important.
There is a significant re-shuffling of income across states due to the markups terms of trade
component. We use the term re-shuffling since this term is zero in the aggregate. For example
in the case of Mizoram, welfare gains from the improvement in its markups terms of trade are
0.22%. This implies that, had this effect not been present, welfare losses would have been around
20% bigger in absolute value. This effect is due to the fact that the increase in wages for states
close to the GQ forced firms located in those states to lower their markups in Mizoram. Thus, the
aggregate markup on the goods imported by Mizoram declined.
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7.2.3 Change in the distribution of markups
Figure IX shows the percentage change in markups that firms charge in Arunachal Pradesh and
Maharashtra, the smallest and the largest states. To construct the figure, we first find the markups
of firms in the various percentiles of the markup distribution before the construction of the GQ.
For each of these percentiles, we then find the average percentage change in markups after the
construction of the GQ. As mentioned before, most firms charge markups that are very close to the
lowest possible one. That is why we only see quantitatively relevant changes starting in the 90th
percentile. We also find that the largest decline is in the 99th percentile of the distribution. This
result is consistent with other works which find that, after trade reforms, declines in markups are
more pronounced among firms with initially high markups. For instance, De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal, and Pavcnik (2016) find that, for high-markup products (above the 90th percentile),
the same reduction in tariffs results in an additional 3.14% decline in markups. Lastly, we find
that the markups in the 90th and 95th percentiles of the distribution increase. On the other
hand, in both cases, we find that this increase is smaller than the decline among the firms in the
99th percentile. The model also indicates that the largest declines in markups are in Maharashtra.
This finding is consistent with the fact that Maharashtra experienced the largest gains in allocative
efficiency.
7.2.4 Ricardian
We now turn to the Ricardian component of welfare across states, which is generally positive and
large across states. It also explains the negative effects for the states in the Northeast. The fact
that the Ricardian term is negative for Northeastern states comes from the fact that the price
index under marginal cost pricing increases. The reason is that it becomes more expensive to
purchase goods at marginal cost from states close to the GQ. The only two factors that affect a
firm’s marginal cost to serve a destination are the transportation costs that it faces and wages.
First, we know that the GQ lowers transportation costs for some destinations and leaves those for
others unchanged. Second, states close to the GQ trade more intensively with each other. The
result is that they become more open and their wages increase. Thus, the increase in wages in the
states close to the GQ outweighs the benefits of the GQ in terms of lower transportation costs.
For states in the Northeast, we find that the negative Ricardian effect induced by changing
trade patterns is mitigated by the markups terms of trade term. The average state in the Northeast
that lost due to the construction of the GQ had an average gain of 0.23% in markups terms of
trade.
Predictions of the model about trade diversion and creation We now study the changes
in state-to-state trade patterns induced by the construction of the GQ. The fact that reductions
in transportation costs are not uniformly distributed across states leaves room for trade diversion
and creation. To study this possibility, we compute bilateral trade flows across all Indian state
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Figure VIII
Percentage change in real income after GQ with HHL components
A: Total change in welfare
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B: Ricardian component
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C: Allocative efficiency component
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D: Markups terms of trade component
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Panel A of Figure VIII shows the percentage change in real income after the decrease in transportation costs due
to the construction of the GQ; Panel B shows the Ricardian component of the change in welfare; Panel C shows
the allocative efficiency component of the change in welfare; Panel D shows the markups terms of trade component
of the change in welfare. The numbers represented in this map correspond to the ones presented in columns 2-6 of
Table VI.
pairs implied by the model before and after the GQ. We define the total trade between state i and
state j as:
Total Tradei,j = exportsij + exports
j
i ,
where exportsij and exports
j
i are the total exports from state i to state j and the total exports
from state j to state i, respectively.
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Figure IX
distribution of the change in markups (Model)
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(B) Firms selling to Maharashtra
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Figure IX shows the average percentage change in markups across firms across different percentiles of the distribution
of markups before the construction of the GQ in the model. Panel A refers to the markups charged on goods sold
in Arunachal Pradesh. Panel B refers to the markups charged on goods sold in Maharashtra. Average % changes
in percentiles lower than 85 are virtually zero and are not reported.
Table X shows summary statistics of the change in trade patterns for state pairs according to
their access to the GQ.20 In the first row, we include state pairs in which both states are crossed
by the GQ. In the second row, we include state pairs in which only one of the states is crossed by
the GQ. In the third row, we include state pairs in which neither state is crossed by the GQ.
We find that on average trade increases considerably more between state pairs in which both
states are either crossed by the GQ or not crossed by the GQ. We also find evidence of trade
diversion. For instance, for the median trade relationship, trade flows between state pairs crossed
by the GQ increase by 4.33%. For state pairs in which neither state is crossed by the GQ, the
median increase in trade is 0.39%. On the other hand, the median change in trade between state
pairs in which only one of the states is crossed by the GQ is -1.11%.
20This analysis is similar in spirit to papers that study trade diversion such as Krueger (1999) and Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1998).
8 Reduced-Form Evidence on the Effects of the GQ
In this section, we use reduced-form approaches to estimate the effect of the GQ regarding two
important economic outcomes: prices and the Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) covariance between
size and productivity. In Section 8.1, we show evidence at the state level, which is the geographical
level at which we have calibrated our model. This allows us to compare our estimates with model
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outcomes. In Section 8.2, we show additional evidence at the district level, which is the maximum
level of geographical disaggregation that we have in the data. This allows us to fully exploit the
richness of our data and apply a more convincing identification strategy.
8.1 Evidence at the state level and data vs. model comparison
Our goal is to compare the results of regressions estimated using using model-simulated data and
regressions estimated using actual data at the state-level. In particular, we study whether the
differential evolution of prices and the OP covariance term across states in the model is similar to
that in the data.
Prices: We estimate the following difference-in-differences regression:
ΔlogPjs = β1ΔGQs +
∑
j
αj + js, (26)
where ΔlogPjs is the change in log price of input j in state s between 2001 and 2006, GQs is a
dummy variable taking value 1 if state s has been crossed by the GQ, αj are product fixed effects,
and js is an error term. Thus, ΔGQs takes value 1 if the state was crossed by the GQ in 2006
but not in 2001.
The results for prices are shown in Panel A of Table XI. We find that prices in states crossed
by the GQ fell on average 39 percentage points more than in states not crossed by the GQ. The
average change in prices in our data is 82%. Thus, relative to the sample mean, there is an
additional decline in prices of 48% (39/82) in states treated by the GQ. In the model, prices went
down 1.30 percentage points more in GQ states than in non-GQ states. Given the average fall in
prices of 0.74% predicted by our model, prices declined by 176% (1.30/0.74) more in GQ states
relative to the average change in prices. We thus find that our model predicts differential changes
that are qualitatively consistent but quantitatively higher than in the data.
OP covariance term between size and productivity: In order to explore the implications
of the GQ on allocative efficiency, we analyze the changes in the OP within-industry covariance
term between size and value added per worker. We show that in both the model and data, the
OP covariance term increased significantly more in regions crossed by the GQ.
To do this exercise, we first compute the OP covariance term for each industry-state in both
2001 and 2006. Let ωij be the log of value added per worker of firm i in industry j. Let θij be
firm i’s share in industry j, which we measure as the fraction of employment accounted for by the
firm in the industry. Given these variables, we define industry j’s log labor productivity ωj as:
ωj =
Kj∑
i
θijωij,
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where Kj is the number of firms in the industry. We can decompose this expression in the following
manner:
ωj = ω¯j +
Kj∑
i=1
(
θij − θ¯j
)
(ωij − ω¯j) ,
where ω¯j is the unweighted average firms’ log value added per worker, and θ¯j is the unweighted
average firm’s industry share. We refer to the second term on the right-hand side of the expression
as the OP covariance term.
In standard trade models, like Melitz (2003), markups are constant and hence there is no
dispersion in value added per worker across firms. Thus, the covariance between size and value
added per worker is zero by construction. This would also be the case in our model in the particular
situation in which all firms charged the same markup. In general, however, whenever there is a
dispersion in markups, the OP covariance term is positive. This comes from the fact that bigger
firms charge higher markups and hence have a higher measured labor productivity. It is important
to note that a higher OP covariance term does hence not necessarily imply higher levels of allocative
efficiency. For instance, the economy attains its first-best when there is no dispersion in markups.
Hence, any other allocation in which markups are heterogeneous would be associated with a higher
OP covariance term and a lower level of allocative efficiency.
In our model, the sector-state OP covariance term between size and value added per worker
is on average 0.0179 in 2001 (before the construction of the GQ) and 0.0209 in 2006 (after the
construction of the GQ). Why does the OP covariance term increase after the construction of the
GQ according to our model? On the one hand, θij (firm’s labor share in the industry) will increase
for the largest firms in a given region due to the decline in their average markup. On the other
hand, this decline in markups will also result in these large firms having a lower measured labor
productivity. The former effect dominates in our calibrated economy, and hence the OP covariance
term is positively associated with the increase in allocative efficiency implied by our model after
the construction of the GQ.
In the data, we find an average sector-state OP covariance term of 0.4056 in 2001 and 0.4804
in 2006. It is not surprising that the covariance between size and productivity is higher in the data
than in the model. In our model, there is only one channel that generates the positive covariance,
which is the presence of endogenous markups. In the data, however, there may be other reasons
that higher value added per worker firms operate at higher scales. Nevertheless, our main goal
is to check whether there was a differential evolution of the OP covariance across states in a way
that is consistent with the model. To this end, we estimate the following regression:
ΔOPjs = βΔGQs +
∑
j
αj + js, (27)
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where ΔOPjs is the change in the OP covariance term in industry j in state s between 2001 and
2006, GQs is a dummy variable taking value 1 if state s has been crossed by the GQ, αj are product
fixed effects, and js is an error term.21
The results of the estimation of equation (27) are shown in Panel B of Table XI. In the data,
the covariance between size and value added per worker in states crossed by the GQ increased
3.67 percentage points more than states not crossed by the GQ. This coefficient is imprecisely
estimated and is associated with a p-value of 0.23. The average change in the covariance was
7.49%. Thus, our estimates implies an additional 49% (3.67/7.49) increase in allocative efficiency
in states treated by the GQ relative to the average. In the model, states crossed by the GQ had an
increase that was 0.31 percentage points higher than in non-GQ states. Given an average change
of 0.29%, the change in allocative efficiency was 107% (0.31/0.29) higher in GQ states relative to
the average change.
Discussion: Whereas the model does relatively well in predicting the differential change in prices
and allocative efficiency between GQ states and non-GQ states, it clearly underpredicts the average
changes. In particular, the average fall (increase) in prices (allocative efficiency) that we measure
in the data is at least an order of magnitude bigger than the one predicted by our model. There
were significant policy changes in Indian manufacturing between 2001 and 2006 that might have
affected prices and allocative efficiency. For example, the removal of large portions of the existing
reservation laws occurred precisely between 2000 and 2009.22 However, our exercise only captures
the effects from the construction of the GQ on economic outcomes. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that the empirical evidence is consistent with the relative evolution in prices and allocative
efficiency predicted by model.
21Each industry is a four-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC), which follows the procedures of the
United Nations’ International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). We map the 2006 codes, expressed in NIC
2004, to the 2001 codes, expressed in NIC 1998. Note that in this exercise, we consider industries (NIC) instead of
products (ASICC). This allows us to use a level of aggregation that is sufficiently coarse to compute the covariance
terms with a large number of observations and, at the same time, provide enough variation. This aggregation
procedure is not possible with 5-digit ASICC data. Moreover, using ASICC entails the problem of dealing with
multi-product plants. We restrict the sample to cells containing at least 10 plants. We also trim the 1% tails of the
distribution of covariance changes in order to reduce the influence of outliers.
22Reservation laws prevented large firms from producing manufacturing goods in a set of goods dictated by the
government. The number of reserved goods declined from approximately 800 in early 2000 to around 90 in 2008.
For more information, see: Bollard, Klenow, and Sharma (2013), Garcia-Santana and Pijoan-Mas (2014), Tewari
and Wilde (2014), or Galle (2016).
8.2 Evidence at the district level
One of the challenges in identifying the causal impact of transportation infrastructure is its non-
random placement. For example, transportation infrastructure may be placed in areas with cha-
racteristics that are correlated to economic outcomes of interest. For example, infrastructure may
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be placed in areas that are expected to have high future growth. An identification strategy used
in the latest empirical literature has exploited the fact that infrastructure projects often aim to
connect historical cities or large economic centers.23 In our particular case, the stated goal of
the GQ was to connect the major urban centers (Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai, and Mumbai). In
this subsection, we estimate a difference-in-differences specification at the district level in which
we compare economic outcomes for districts close to the GQ with those that are far away. We
exclude the major urban centers or nodal districts since these areas were explicitly targeted by
policymakers.
Figure X
Prices and the Golden Quadrilateral
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Figure X shows the estimates of equation (28) at each category of distance. The dependent variable is the log
change in the price of input j between 2001 and 2006 in district d. The coefficients depicted are those associated to
the connectivity of the district, defined as whether the district is within a certain distance from the GQ in 2006 and
2001. Nodal districts are excluded. Panel A displays OLS coefficients and Panel B IV estimates. The instruments
are the distance to the straight line connecting the four and five vertices of the GQ (Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai,
Calcutta, and Bangalore). 95% confidence intervals stemming from robust standard errors clustered at the district
level are drawn in thinner lines.
23See Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian (2012) for an early example of this empirical strategy. This strategy has also
been applied to the GQ by Alder (2017), Datta (2012), and Ghani, Goswami, and Kerr (2016). Our differences-
in-differences strategy mimics that of these papers and we follow this literature in excluding nodal districts. Note
that Alder (2017) studies the effect on economic activity; Datta (2012) on inventories, supplier relationships and
perceptions of transport quality; and Ghani, Goswami, and Kerr (2016) on the organization and efficiency of the
formal manufacturing activity.
Prices: We estimate the following differences-in-differences regression:
ΔlogPjd = β1ΔGQd +
∑
j
αj + jd, (28)
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Figure XI
Road Network in India, the GQ and the straight line GQ
A: Straight line IV B: Straight line IV through Bangalore
Panel A of Figure XI shows a map with the road network in India in 2006, including the sections of the Golden
Quadrilateral that were finished by then (around 95% of the total project) and the IV straight line. Panel B shows
the same map but making the straight line going through Bangalore.
24We compute a weighted average of the prices paid by plants consuming the input in the district, excluding
products with evidence of unit misreporting. We have data for 920 inputs consumed in 325 districts. See the Online
Appendix for more details.
where ΔlogPjd is the change in log price of input j in district d between 2001 and 2006, GQd is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if district d has been “treated” by the GQ, αj are product fixed
effects, and jd is an error term.24 Thus, ΔGQd takes value 1 if a district was within the specified
distance of the GQ in 2006 but not in 2001. Distance is calculated as the shortest straight-line
distance between the district and a treated portion of the GQ. We use categories of distance
ranging from 25 to 300 kilometers. Standard errors are clustered at the district level in order to
account for the possible serial correlation of price shocks within districts.
The estimates of equation (28) can be found in columns (1) and (2) of Table XII. The results in
column (1) include nodal districts. Column (2), which is our baseline specification, excludes nodal
districts. Each column shows the estimate of β1 under different specifications of the treatment
distance.
We find that prices declined significantly for areas close to the GQ relative to those farther
away. For example, we find that for districts located within 25 km of the GQ, input prices declined
by almost 60 percentage points more than in districts located farther away. Furthermore, we find
that this effect dissipates as we increase the treatment distance. This trend towards zero can be
seen in Panel A of Figure X, in which we plot the coefficients in column (2) in steps of 25 km.
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Finally, we find that the exclusion of the nodal cities does not significantly change the estimates.
Recent empirical work, such as the work by Faber (2014), has emphasized the non-random
placement of infrastructure even outside of non-nodal areas. Thus, we check the robustness of
our results by instrumenting the distance to the GQ that we use in estimating equation (28). In
particular, we instrument it with the straight lines that connect the four nodal cities, shown in
Panel A of Figure XI. These straight lines resemble the lowest-cost path connecting the nodal
cities. The identifying assumption is that the distance to the straight line affects districts only
through how likely they are to be close to the GQ network. We add a second IV specification
with a straight line connecting the city of Bangalore, shown in Panel B of Figure XI. These set
straight-line IVs were used by Ghani, Goswami, and Kerr (2016). Columns (3) and (4) of Table
XII show the results of these IV specifications. We find that the effects of the GQ on prices follow
a similar pattern and are somewhat higher in absolute value. In Panel B of Figure X, we show
that the overall pattern remains the same as in the baseline case.
OP covariance term between size and productivity: We estimate the following regression:
ΔOPjd = βΔGQd +
∑
j
αj + jd, (29)
where ΔOPjd is the change between 2001 and 2006 in the OP covariance term in industry j in
district d, GQd is a dummy variable taking value 1 if district d has been “treated” by the GQ, αj
are product fixed effects, and jd is an error term. As before, distance is calculated as the shortest
straight-line distance between the district and a treated portion of the GQ.
Table XIII shows the results of estimating equation (29). As before, column (1) includes
nodal cities in the estimation and column (2) excludes them. We find improvements in allocative
efficiency in the districts that became treated by the GQ compared with districts further away.
The improvement in the covariance term is a decreasing function of distance, and converges rapidly
towards zero. This pattern can be seen in Panel A of Figure XII, which shows the coefficient of β
found in column (2).
For robustness, we estimate the specification using the straight-line IVs described above. We
find that the results do not change as shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table XIII. The confidence
intervals increase in size due to the use of the IV. However, the results preserve the relationship
that allocative efficiency increased more in districts close to the GQ. The coefficients of column
(4) are plotted in Panel B of Figure XII.
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Figure XII
Allocative efficiency and the Golden Quadrilateral
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Figure XII shows the estimates of equation (29) at each category of distance. The dependent variable is the
change between 2001 and 2006 of the Olley and Pakes (1996) within-industry cross-sectional covariance between
the fraction of industry labor used by the plant and labor productivity in industry (NIC) j and district d. The
coefficients depicted are those associated to the connectivity of the district, which takes value one if the district was
within a certain distance of the Golden Quadrilateral in 2006 but not in 2001, and zero otherwise. Nodal districts
are excluded. Panel A displays OLS coefficients and Panel B IV estimates. The instruments are the distance to the
straight line connecting the four and five vertices of the GQ (Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, Calcutta, and Bangalore).
95% confidence intervals stemming from robust standard errors clustered at the district level are drawn in thinner
lines.
9 Sensitivity Analysis and Additional Discussions
9.1 Sensitivity analysis of parameters
We now examine the sensitivity of our results by considering versions of our model in which we
change the value of some of the crucial parameters. We first examine the implications of setting
a lower value for the elasticity of substitution across sectors, θ. Second, we study a version of the
model in which productivity shocks are uncorrelated across states.
For all these cases, we keep the rest of the parameters which we estimated outside the model
constant, and re-calibrate the labor endowment for each state i, Li, and the shape parameter of
the Pareto distribution, α. To match the fact that the top 5% of plants in manufacturing account
for 89% of total value added. The model requires a shape parameter of 1.61 in the case of θ = 1.24,
and 4.42 in the case of uncorrelated draws (vs. 2.28 in our benchmark calibration).
We find that the aggregate gains are remarkably stable across specifications. The share of allo-
cative efficiency gains is similar to the benchmark calibration in the case of the lower θ. However,
allocative efficiency gains disappear in the case of uncorrelated productivity draws across states.
A lower elasticity of substitution across sectors We set θ = 1.24, which is the value
estimated by Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015) using Taiwanese data. In this economy, the
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maximum markup a firm can charge is 5.17 (vs. 2.01). There is more misallocation than in the
benchmark economy: the allocative efficiency index ranges from 0.89 to 0.92 across states, whereas
in the benchmark calibration it ranges from 0.96 to 0.98. The reason is that the lower θ implies
that firms with large market shares charge higher markups, increasing the dispersion of markups.
It is interesting to note that the results do not change significantly relative to our baseline
case. In this specification, allocative efficiency gains increase to 0.24% (vs. 0.20%). The share of
allocative efficiency gains increases to 8.1% of the gains (vs. 7.4%). At the state level, allocative
efficiency gains represent up to 20% of the overall gains (vs. 18%).
A value of 1.24 for θ would imply a trade elasticity for monopolists that is too low compared
to the one we estimate using Indian data.
Uncorrelated productivity draws We next examine how our results change if we have uncor-
related productivity draws across locations. We find that aggregate gains increase to 3.09% (vs.
2.72%). Furthermore, allocative efficiency gains do not account for any of the aggregate gains.
However, the case of uncorrelated productivity draws does not match the data along two impor-
tant dimensions. First, when we calculate our similarity index for this economy, we find a value
of 0.26. This is lower than 0.46, which we obtained in our baseline calibration, and lower than
0.43, which we measure in the data. Thus, the degree of head-to-head competition that firms are
confronted with is too low in the case of uncorrelated draws. Furthermore, the trade elasticity is
2.84 in the case of uncorrelated productivity draws, which is too low relative to those estimated in
the literature. On the other hand, the trade elasticity of 4.74 implied by the baseline calibration
is consistent with estimates from the literature.
9.2 Additional discussions
We now study the implications of various changes to our baseline specification. First, we study
how our results would change if we accounted for differences in state-level productivity. Second,
we examine whether the construction of the GQ induced more migration across states and the
implications of allowing for migration within the context of our model. Next, we consider the
decomposition used by Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015) to the one used in our baseline results.
Finally, we compare our results with those implied by a model of monopolistic competition.
State-specific productivity levels We now study the implications of including a state-specific
productivity term in the calibration of the model to account for cross-state heterogeneity in pro-
ductivity.
Proposition 1. Consider the calibrated economy in Section 6. Now consider an alternative cali-
bration in which we raise the productivities of all firms in one economy by a common factor and
re-calibrate the labor endowments of all economies to match the total income of each state. In the
new calibration, the equilibrium distribution of prices, markups, market shares, value of sales, and
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quantities sold across destinations remain the same for all firms. Furthermore, the price index and
aggregate output for each state remain the same. Finally, total labor income and profits for each
state also remain unchanged.
Proof. See Section 9.2 of the Online Appendix for full proof.
In Proposition 1, we consider an alternative calibration from the one in Section 6. In the
alternative calibration, we include a state-specific constant term on the productivity of firms
located in a particular state and re-calibrate the labor endowments. We find that the state-
specific constant term will not affect the distribution of markups in the new calibrated economy.
What we find is that the marginal cost of firms remains unchanged since both equilibrium wages
and productivity change by the same factor. Since the marginal cost of firms does not change, the
distribution of markups also remains unchanged. Likewise, we show that other key variables do not
change in the new calibration. Thus, we conclude that cross-state heterogeneity in productivity
will not affect our calibration.
Labor migration Most of the internal migration in India corresponds to short-distance mo-
vements within the same state. According to the 2001 Indian Population Census, around 96% of
people report to be living in the state where they were born, making interstate migration flows in
India among the lowest in the world.25 These low levels of migration are often attributed to factors
other than transportation costs, such as cultural differences across regions and the importance of
social networks in providing insurance, as emphasized by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016). Yet it
could be the case that the construction of the GQ resulted in increased inter-state migration. In
that sense, a possible shortcoming of our model is the fact that we are not allowing for labor mobi-
lity across states, which could change our estimates of the effects of the GQ. To better understand
whether this is empirically relevant, we estimated a differences-in-differences regression of states’
net internal migration rate changes between 1999/2000 and 2007/2008 against a dummy capturing
whether the state is crossed by the GQ. We do not find a significant effect of being crossed by
the GQ on state internal migration rates (see Online Appendix GLabor migration across states
after the construction of the GQappendix.G for details).26 This evidence is consistent with high
25Additional evidence is provided by Mahapatro (2012), who shows that around 75% and close to 90% of male
and female internal migration happens within the state boundaries, respectively.
26Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) develop a model based on Eaton and Kortum (2002) which is suited to analyze
the impact of improved infrastructure in settings in which labor is mobile across regions. Their theory predicts
that areas with improved access to transportation infrastructure (market access) should see increases in population.
Using this type of model within the Indian context, Alder (2017) estimates the relationship between changes in
market access at the district-level due to the GQ and district-level population between 2001 and 2011. He did not
find statistically significant changes in population as a response to changes in market access due to upgrades in
transportation infrastructure. These results suggest that there are high migration costs even between districts of
the same state in India.
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migration costs across states, which in this case prevent workers from moving to areas which enjoy
higher wages due to improved transportation infrastructure.
Although we do not see evidence that the GQ induced migration across states, we can hypot-
hesize about how migration could affect allocative efficiency within the context of our model. It
seems reasonable to think that a model with limited migration would predict some migration from
states far from the GQ, to states close to the GQ, for which our model predicts a significant in-
crease in wages. If that is the case, the implied increase in wages would be lower in such states,
since labor supply would be higher. In this situation, firms located in those state would decrease
their markups by less due to the lower increase in their marginal cost. These effects would imply
an increase in allocative efficiency which would be lower than the one predicted by our current
model.
Decomposition of changes in real income used by Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015)
We consider the decomposition used by Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2015), which allows us to
decompose changes in real income into those attributed to the Ricardian and allocative efficiency
components. Note that these authors consider a model in which symmetric economies trade
with each other and thus do not consider the terms of trade component. For that reason, we
only decompose changes in national real income, which does not have any terms of trade. At the
national-level, the HHL decomposition is similar to the decomposition used by Edmond, Midrigan,
and Xu (2015) as we find that the terms of trade term is zero in the HHL decomposition.
We decompose changes in the real income of India to be
Δ ln Y = Δ ln Y FB︸ ︷︷ ︸ + Δ ln Y − Δ ln Y FB︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ricardian Allocative efficiency
,
where Y is the Indian real income and Y FB is the Indian first-best real income. To find the Indian
real income, we sum the real income of all states. To calculate the first-best real income, we hold
fixed the calibrated parameters and we resolve the model in the case in which all firms charge
marginal cost. When we lower transportation costs, there will be an increase in the first-best real
income. Thus, the allocative efficiency component captures the changes in real income that cannot
be attributed to this increase in the first-best real income.
We find that there is an increase in real income of 2.72%. Of that increase, 2.51% is accounted
for by the Ricardian component and 0.21% by allocative efficiency. This implies that 7.7% of the
total aggregate gains are accounted for by allocative efficiency. Note that this is comparable to
the allocative efficiency component reported in Table VI.
Comparison with monopolistic competition How much different would the estimated effects
be if we use a more standard model of trade? And second, is there a way to discriminate between
the two models? To answer the first question, we re-do our quantitative exercise using a model
of monopolistic competition. To conduct this exercise, we use our model and set θ = γ. Note
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that in this case, all firms have the same markup and hence only the standard gains from trade
operate. To make the exercise comparable to our baseline, we set the elasticity of substitution to
5.71, so that the model generates the trade elasticity of 4.71 as in the baseline (see Section 6.6).
We re-calibrate the labor endowments and tail parameter of the Pareto distribution to match the
same statistics as in the benchmark case.
We find that the model of monopolistic competition generates aggregate gains of 2.83% (vs.
2.72% for our benchmark case). Thus, the aggregate gains are 4% higher in the model of monopo-
listic competition. This means that, if a policy maker wants to learn about the aggregate effects
of the GQ, a standard model of trade and our richer model will provide approximately the same
answer.
However, the distribution of gains across states is quite different. Figure XIII shows a scat-
terplot of the percentage point difference in the gains from the benchmark model and that of
monopolistic competition. We plot this against the log of the ratio of the real income of the
state and that of the smallest state. We find that the smallest and largest states gain more in
the benchmark case. The states with the higher gains are precisely those which see larger effects
from allocative efficiency and markups terms of trade in the baseline case. The percentage point
differences range from -0.6% to 0.2%.
Figure XIII
Baseline model vs Monopolistic competition model
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Figure XIII shows the gains in real income for each state predicted by our baseline model
minus those of a re-calibrated model of monopolistic competition. We plot this difference
against the relative size of the state.
The answer to the second question is more difficult. In Section 8.1, we find that states crossed
by the GQ were associated with larger declines in prices. We also find that those states experien-
ced larger increases in the covariance between size and productivity. The first piece of evidence
is consistent with a standard model that has constant markups across firms, so it does not help
us to discriminate between the two models. As discussed in Section 8.1, the standard model with
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10 Conclusion
Construction of new transportation infrastructure is an important policy tool for international
organizations and policymakers. Hence, understanding the economic effects of building new in-
frastructure is a matter of great importance in development. Not surprisingly, there has been
much attention to this question. In fact, several different methodologies have been used to study
this issue. First, there is an extensive empirical literature that uses a differences-in-differences
approach to provide causal estimates of the effects of different types of infrastructure on econo-
mic outcomes. Second, there has been a recent emphasis on using a more structural approach,
which consists of exploiting the structure of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to discipline the
empirical specifications, known as the “market access” approach. This approach is quite useful
because it allows the empirical specifications to capture the general equilibrium effects present in
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model.
The current paper aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the gains from improved
infrastructure using a framework in which “firms matter.” Our motivation for this approach is
driven by the existence of a prominent literature that emphasizes misallocation of resources across
firms as an important determinant of productivity and income in developing countries. We use the
case of the GQ in India, which is an important road infrastructure project in the early 2000s. First,
we quantify the aggregate gains and the gains across states from the GQ. Then, we decompose
these gains to determine the relative importance of allocative efficiency.
More generally, our paper also contributes to the debate about the distributional consequences
across regions of investing in infrastructure. Our model predicts, for instance, that using frame-
works that consider variable markups can have implications for the distribution of gains. Our
model also predicts that states that were initially poor became even less integrated as measured
by their degree of trade openness with respect to the rest of the country. As emphasized by Alder
(2017), the choice of the location of infrastructure and which cities are connected can have im-
plications for income convergence across regions. Investigating possible mechanisms such as the
creation of an interstate revenue sharing program that could help reduce regional inequality is an
interesting avenue for future research.
constant markups would fail to predict the second piece. The reason is that the OP covariance
term is zero in that model and hence it implies no changes by construction. In our model, ho-
wever, variable markups imply a positive OP covariance term whose level is affected by changes
in competition. In particular, our model predicts that the OP covariance term increases after
the construction of the GQ, and relatively more so in states affected by the fall in transportation
costs. Importantly, in the case of our calibrated economy, that increase in the OP covariance term
is associated with an improvement in allocative efficiency.
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Our analysis admittedly abstracts from additional channels through which transportation in-
frastructure may affect real income. For example, our framework ignores the importance of input-
output linkages. Lower transportation costs would allow firms to have access to cheaper interme-
diate goods. Hence, improvements in transportation infrastructure in a particular region could act
as a productivity shock and propagate to other regions through the production network (Caliendo,
Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and Sarte (Forthcoming)). Another limitation of our framework is the lack
of firm dynamics. Hsieh and Klenow (2014) show that differences in firms’ life cycle dynamics may
explain the low productivity in the Indian manufacturing sector. Changes in transportation costs
could potentially affect firms’ expectations about business opportunities and hence their incentives
to innovate and grow. Analyzing these additional channels is left for future research.
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Table I
Impact of Road Distance and Infrastructure Quality on Prices
2001 & 2006 State Transport 2006 2001
2006 FE Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: All columns except 4: Log price at district of destination. Column 4: Log price of transportation cost.
Effective Distance 2nd decile 0.2855∗∗ 0.2429∗ 0.2771∗∗ 0.2675∗∗∗
(0.1196) (0.1440) (0.1217) (0.0719)
Effective Distance 3th decile 0.2120∗ 0.1797 0.1368 0.5394∗∗∗
(0.1168) (0.1442) (0.1229) (0.0714)
Effective Distance 4th decile 0.0981 0.0618 0.0070 0.9513∗∗∗
(0.1206) (0.1554) (0.1298) (0.0662)
Effective Distance 5th decile 0.1305 0.0114 0.0980 1.1635∗∗∗
(0.1351) (0.1582) (0.1418) (0.0658)
Effective Distance 6th decile 0.3538∗∗∗ 0.3784∗∗ 0.3163∗∗ 1.2869∗∗∗
(0.1320) (0.1731) (0.1394) (0.0663)
Effective Distance 7th decile 0.3009∗∗ 0.1835 0.2884∗∗ 1.3895∗∗∗
(0.1390) (0.1747) (0.1456) (0.0663)
Effective Distance 8th decile 0.3491∗∗ 0.2615 0.3045∗ 1.4892∗∗∗
(0.1510) (0.1814) (0.1597) (0.0676)
Effective Distance 9th decile 0.2476∗ 0.3279∗ 0.2674∗ 1.6771∗∗∗
(0.1485) (0.1914) (0.1599) (0.0680)
Effective Distance 10th decile 0.5107∗∗∗ 0.5770∗∗∗ 0.5282∗∗∗ 1.9164∗∗∗
(0.1439) (0.1990) (0.1608) (0.0698)
Log Effective Distance 0.0765∗∗∗
(0.0293)
Predicted Price in 2001 0.7952∗
(0.4594)
Origin-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES - YES -
Product-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES - YES -
State-Year Fixed Effects - - YES - - -
Origin Fixed Effects - - - YES - YES
Product Fixed Effects - - - - - YES
Observations 1,999 1,460 1,999 1,372 1,460 539
R-squared 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.86 0.88
Number of products 165 119 165 - 119 53
Number of origins 86 63 86 75 63 38
Number of destinations 367 338 367 319 338 171
Table I shows the results of the estimation of equation (17). The dependent variable is the log price at a destination of a product
manufactured by a monopolist. The variable of interest is the effective distance between the district where the product is manufactured
and the destination district. Effective distance is defined as the least cost path between both districts, taking into account road distance
and infrastructure quality. Specifically, using the Golden Quadrilateral reduces effective distance by 48 percent relative to roads that
are not part of the Golden Quadrilateral. The least cost path is computed by converting the road network into a graph and applying
Dijkstra’s alogrithm. Columns (1) and (2) use our ASI-NSS data for 2001 & 2006 and 2006, respectively. Column (3) adds destination
state fixed effects to the specification of column (1). The dependent variable of column (4) is the log price of shipping a container
from origin to destination, according to GIR Logistics. Column (5) introduces effective distance linearly and estimates the regression
with data of 2006, and column (6) compares the estimated prices in 2001 from column (5) to the actual prices in 2001. All pooled
specifications include origin-year and product-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗: 10%;
∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%. 49
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Table II
Gravity Equations for Monopolists
ASI-NSS ASI-NSS State FE Transport Costs
Years 2001 Year 2006 in First as Effective
& 2006 Stage Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Log value of sales at district of destination
log τod -0.9917∗ -0.8378 -0.7772 -0.2085∗∗∗
(0.5821) (0.5588) (0.5359) (0.0647)
Origin-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Destination-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Product-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,999 1,460 1,999 1,999
R-squared 0.58 0.54 0,59 0.59
Number of Origins 86 63 86 86
Number of Destinations 367 338 367 367
Number of Products 165 119 165 165
Table II shows the estimates of equation (22). The dependent variable is the log value of sales at
the destination of products manufactured by monopolists. The variable of interest is the predicted
values of equation (17), namely the predicted transportation costs across districts. In columns
(1) to (3) the predicted transportation costs are those derived from columns (1) to (3) of Table
I, i.e. log τˆod,t = βˆk if Effective Distance
o
d,t ∈ decile k. In column (4) we assume the functional
form log τˆod,t = βˆEffective Distance
o
d,t, and impose β = 1. Hence, we include effective distance
directly as a covariate in equation (22). This amounts to assuming that the differences in effective
distance (transportation infrastructure) fully translate into prices. All specifications include origin-
year, destination-year, and product-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1816
Table III
Labor Shares vs Sectoral shares
2001-2006 2006
Labor Capital+Labor Labor Capital+Labor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Share in firm’s value added
Firm’s sectoral share -0.3407∗∗∗ -0.4633∗∗∗ -0.4088∗∗∗ -0.4932∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.0937) (0.0941) (0.1058)
State-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Product-Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,257 1,510 1,166 1,008
R-squared 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.89
Table III shows the estimates of an OLS regression of firms’ labor shares against sectoral shares
(equation (24)) for products (measured at the ASICC 5-digit level) that are operated only in one
state. Column (1) shows the results including the pool of observations for the years 2001 and
2006. Column (2) shows the results for the same regression but includes capital remuneration on
the left hand side. Columns (3) and (4) are the equivalent but include only observations for the
year 2006. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis: *: 10%; **: 5%; ***: 1%. The implied γ’s
in columns 1-4, which are given by γ = θˆ/
(
1 + βˆθˆ
)
(with θˆ = 1.99), are 6.17, 25.30, 10.67, 107.38
respectively.
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
58
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º
 1
8x
x
T
ab
le
IV
M
ar
ku
ps
in
th
e
M
od
el
st
at
e
st
d
m
ea
n
p9
5
p9
9
lo
g
p9
9/
p5
0
be
fo
re
af
te
r
%
ch
an
ge
be
fo
re
af
te
r
%
ch
an
ge
be
fo
re
af
te
r
%
ch
an
ge
be
fo
re
af
te
r
%
ch
an
ge
be
fo
re
af
te
r
%
ch
an
ge
M
ah
ar
as
ht
ra
0.
04
64
0.
04
59
-1
.1
63
9
1.
11
04
1.
11
04
-0
.0
02
8
1.
12
5
1.
12
6
0.
08
0
1.
29
5
1.
28
8
-0
.5
21
0.
16
0
0.
15
5
-3
.3
10
G
uj
ar
at
0.
04
58
0.
04
53
-1
.1
02
5
1.
11
04
1.
11
04
-0
.0
02
6
1.
12
6
1.
12
7
0.
07
0
1.
28
9
1.
28
3
-0
.4
19
0.
15
5
0.
15
1
-2
.7
36
Ta
m
il
N
ad
u
0.
04
57
0.
04
51
-1
.2
42
1
1.
11
04
1.
11
04
-0
.0
02
9
1.
12
6
1.
12
7
0.
12
4
1.
28
7
1.
27
9
-0
.5
87
0.
15
4
0.
14
8
-3
.8
91
U
tt
ar
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
04
42
0.
04
40
-0
.5
68
6
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
3
1.
13
0
1.
13
1
0.
07
1
1.
26
6
1.
26
3
-0
.3
05
0.
13
8
0.
13
5
-2
.2
43
K
ar
na
ta
ka
0.
04
51
0.
04
45
-1
.3
37
7
1.
11
04
1.
11
03
-0
.0
03
2
1.
12
7
1.
12
9
0.
17
6
1.
27
5
1.
26
8
-0
.5
64
0.
14
5
0.
13
9
-3
.9
80
A
nd
hr
a
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
04
44
0.
04
41
-0
.5
88
5
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
4
1.
13
0
1.
13
0
0.
06
2
1.
26
5
1.
26
2
-0
.2
48
0.
13
7
0.
13
5
-1
.8
26
W
es
t
B
en
ga
l
0.
04
41
0.
04
42
0.
20
96
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
05
1.
13
0
1.
13
1
0.
01
3
1.
26
7
1.
26
7
0.
06
2
0.
13
8
0.
13
9
0.
45
2
H
ar
ya
na
0.
04
41
0.
04
38
-0
.7
15
7
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
6
1.
13
1
1.
13
2
0.
09
3
1.
26
3
1.
25
9
-0
.2
91
0.
13
5
0.
13
2
-2
.1
85
Jh
ar
kh
an
d
0.
04
40
0.
04
41
0.
15
81
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
04
1.
13
2
1.
13
1
-0
.0
83
1.
26
3
1.
26
5
0.
15
0
0.
13
5
0.
13
7
1.
10
2
R
aj
as
th
an
0.
04
40
0.
04
39
-0
.3
42
7
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
8
1.
13
1
1.
13
1
0.
03
7
1.
26
2
1.
26
1
-0
.0
77
0.
13
4
0.
13
3
-0
.5
77
M
ad
hy
a
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
04
38
0.
04
37
-0
.2
20
9
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
5
1.
13
1
1.
13
2
0.
03
1
1.
26
0
1.
25
9
-0
.0
87
0.
13
3
0.
13
2
-0
.6
58
Pu
nj
ab
0.
04
39
0.
04
38
-0
.3
35
8
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
8
1.
13
1
1.
13
2
0.
04
9
1.
26
0
1.
25
8
-0
.1
18
0.
13
2
0.
13
1
-0
.8
97
O
ris
sa
0.
04
39
0.
04
37
-0
.4
19
0
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
0
1.
13
1
1.
13
2
0.
05
9
1.
26
1
1.
25
9
-0
.2
12
0.
13
4
0.
13
2
-1
.5
96
H
im
ac
ha
lP
ra
de
sh
0.
04
40
0.
04
40
-0
.1
74
1
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
4
1.
13
1
1.
13
1
0.
00
5
1.
26
2
1.
26
1
-0
.1
08
0.
13
4
0.
13
3
-0
.8
09
C
ha
tt
isg
ar
h
0.
04
39
0.
04
39
-0
.1
61
2
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
4
1.
13
1
1.
13
1
0.
01
5
1.
26
2
1.
26
1
-0
.0
53
0.
13
4
0.
13
4
-0
.3
93
K
er
al
a
0.
04
45
0.
04
43
-0
.4
64
4
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
1
1.
12
9
1.
12
9
0.
07
3
1.
26
7
1.
26
5
-0
.1
74
0.
13
8
0.
13
6
-1
.2
66
D
el
hi
0.
04
40
0.
04
36
-0
.7
59
4
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
7
1.
13
1
1.
13
2
0.
08
6
1.
26
0
1.
25
7
-0
.2
49
0.
13
3
0.
13
0
-1
.8
93
U
tt
ar
an
ch
al
0.
04
39
0.
04
37
-0
.3
37
1
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
8
1.
13
2
1.
13
2
0.
05
7
1.
26
0
1.
25
8
-0
.1
32
0.
13
2
0.
13
1
-1
.0
01
G
oa
0.
04
47
0.
04
48
0.
37
91
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
08
1.
12
8
1.
12
8
0.
00
9
1.
26
9
1.
27
2
0.
24
9
0.
14
0
0.
14
2
1.
76
7
A
ss
am
0.
04
37
0.
04
35
-0
.3
64
0
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
9
1.
13
2
1.
13
2
0.
07
0
1.
26
1
1.
25
8
-0
.2
23
0.
13
3
0.
13
1
-1
.6
86
B
ih
ar
0.
04
35
0.
04
39
0.
96
13
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
22
1.
13
3
1.
13
2
-0
.1
26
1.
25
7
1.
26
4
0.
58
9
0.
13
0
0.
13
6
4.
43
4
Ja
m
m
u
an
d
K
as
hm
ir
0.
04
35
0.
04
36
0.
22
52
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
05
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
-0
.0
24
1.
25
7
1.
25
7
0.
01
3
0.
13
0
0.
13
0
0.
10
0
M
eg
ha
la
ya
0.
04
36
0.
04
34
-0
.4
31
3
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
01
0
1.
13
2
1.
13
3
0.
08
7
1.
25
9
1.
25
6
-0
.2
27
0.
13
2
0.
12
9
-1
.7
42
Tr
ip
ur
a
0.
04
35
0.
04
34
-0
.1
59
2
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
4
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
0.
03
5
1.
25
8
1.
25
6
-0
.0
95
0.
13
1
0.
13
0
-0
.7
32
M
an
ip
ur
0.
04
35
0.
04
34
-0
.1
39
9
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
3
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
0.
02
7
1.
25
8
1.
25
6
-0
.1
04
0.
13
1
0.
13
0
-0
.8
01
N
ag
al
an
d
0.
04
35
0.
04
34
-0
.2
54
6
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
6
1.
13
2
1.
13
3
0.
04
0
1.
25
8
1.
25
6
-0
.1
60
0.
13
1
0.
13
0
-1
.2
31
Si
kk
im
0.
04
34
0.
04
35
0.
09
90
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
0.
00
02
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
0.
01
2
1.
25
6
1.
25
6
-0
.0
11
0.
12
9
0.
12
9
-0
.0
89
M
iz
or
am
0.
04
34
0.
04
34
-0
.1
36
8
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
3
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
0.
02
8
1.
25
7
1.
25
6
-0
.0
71
0.
13
0
0.
13
0
-0
.5
43
A
ru
na
ch
al
Pr
ad
es
h
0.
04
35
0.
04
34
-0
.1
18
8
1.
11
03
1.
11
03
-0
.0
00
3
1.
13
3
1.
13
3
0.
03
5
1.
25
7
1.
25
6
-0
.0
86
0.
13
1
0.
13
0
-0
.6
62
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1816
Table V
Parameter values (benchmark calibration)
Param. Definition Value
(A) Parameters estimated with structural equations
τ od Iceberg transportation costs between states varies by state pair
θ Elasticity of substitution across sectors 1.99
γ Elasticity of substitution within sector 10.67
(B) Parameters taken directly from data
Kij Number of firms operating in sector j of country i varies by state/sector
(C) Parameters calibrated in equilibrium
Li Labor endowment of the states varies by state
α Shape parameter Pareto 2.28
Table V refers to a our benchmark calibration. We explain how we estimate the parameters τod , θ, and γ, in sections
6.1, 6.4, and 6.5 respectively. We set the value Kij to match the number of plants observed in the data. We
calibrate Ln to the relative manufacturing value added across states. We calibrate α to to match the fact that the
top 5% of plants in manufacturing accounted for 89% of value added in 2006 (see section 6.6 for details).
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Table VI
Changes in Real Income Resulting from the GQ
state size income change descomposition
ηw ηPpc ηToT ηae
India 2.72 2.10 0.44 0.00 0.20
Maharashtra 100.00 1.78 1.67 -0.36 0.15 0.32
Gujarat 64.58 3.05 2.34 0.30 0.05 0.37
Tamil Nadu 40.74 2.43 2.07 -0.02 0.06 0.31
Uttar Pradesh 28.81 2.11 1.81 0.25 -0.08 0.12
Karnataka 25.99 4.07 2.76 0.96 0.11 0.23
Andhra Pradesh 20.20 1.92 1.64 0.19 -0.01 0.10
Haryana 18.04 1.27 1.43 -0.18 -0.07 0.10
West Bengal 17.80 6.88 4.15 3.29 -0.50 -0.06
Jharkhand 16.21 8.28 4.36 3.75 0.03 0.14
Rajasthan 11.96 3.62 2.49 1.26 -0.16 0.02
Madhya Pradesh 10.68 0.54 0.94 -0.42 -0.02 0.04
Orissa 10.02 3.36 2.30 0.94 0.01 0.11
Punjab 9.61 1.49 1.40 0.11 -0.06 0.04
Himachal Pradesh 8.97 1.44 1.50 0.12 -0.22 0.03
Chattisgarh 8.74 0.00 0.76 -0.70 -0.07 0.02
Kerala 6.98 1.81 1.48 0.22 0.01 0.10
Delhi 4.32 1.05 1.08 -0.25 0.12 0.09
Uttaranchal 4.32 1.67 1.48 0.20 -0.05 0.03
Assam 3.42 1.57 1.40 0.04 0.04 0.09
Goa 3.26 11.22 6.06 5.85 -0.44 -0.26
Bihar 2.47 7.25 4.23 3.98 -0.66 -0.30
Jammu and Kashmir 2.38 0.47 0.87 -0.18 -0.18 -0.04
Meghalaya 0.55 2.13 1.65 0.29 0.11 0.09
Tripura 0.24 -1.54 -0.19 -1.54 0.15 0.04
Manipur 0.11 -1.49 -0.21 -1.56 0.24 0.03
Nagaland 0.07 -0.62 0.21 -1.10 0.21 0.05
Sikkim 0.03 6.00 3.28 2.46 0.25 0.01
Mizoram 0.02 -1.11 0.16 -1.52 0.22 0.03
Arunachal Pradesh 0.01 -1.35 0.00 -1.68 0.31 0.02
Table VI shows the percentage change in real income and the decomposition of the Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014)
index for the 29 Indian states; ηw represents the % change in labor income component of the index; ηPpc represents
the % change in the marginal cost price component; ηToT represents the % change in the markups terms of trade
component; and ηae represents the % change in the allocative efficiency component.
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Table VII
Quantitative Results
state wn 1Ppcn
μselln
μbuyn
Ppcn
Pn
μbuyn
before after before after before after before after
Maharashtra 0.4218 0.4289 0.0124 0.0123 1.0272 1.0288 0.9635 0.9666
Gujarat 0.4234 0.4334 0.0120 0.0120 1.0160 1.0165 0.9669 0.9705
Tamil Nadu 0.4414 0.4506 0.0117 0.0117 0.9986 0.9993 0.9698 0.9728
Uttar Pradesh 0.4740 0.4827 0.0116 0.0116 0.9986 0.9978 0.9770 0.9782
Karnataka 0.4664 0.4795 0.0116 0.0117 0.9847 0.9858 0.9750 0.9773
Andhra Pradesh 0.4946 0.5028 0.0115 0.0115 0.9892 0.9891 0.9783 0.9793
Haryana 0.4801 0.4870 0.0116 0.0116 0.9805 0.9798 0.9788 0.9798
West Bengal 0.4859 0.5065 0.0111 0.0115 0.9864 0.9815 0.9772 0.9766
Jharkhand 0.4038 0.4218 0.0113 0.0117 0.9957 0.9960 0.9764 0.9778
Rajasthan 0.5022 0.5149 0.0115 0.0116 0.9864 0.9849 0.9791 0.9793
Madhya Pradesh 0.5020 0.5068 0.0115 0.0115 0.9736 0.9734 0.9797 0.9801
Orissa 0.4702 0.4811 0.0113 0.0114 0.9756 0.9757 0.9792 0.9803
Punjab 0.5210 0.5284 0.0113 0.0113 0.9899 0.9893 0.9797 0.9801
Himachal Pradesh 0.4740 0.4812 0.0112 0.0112 0.9803 0.9782 0.9787 0.9790
Chattisgarh 0.4486 0.4520 0.0114 0.0113 0.9702 0.9695 0.9788 0.9790
Kerala 0.5346 0.5425 0.0111 0.0111 0.9855 0.9856 0.9778 0.9787
Delhi 0.5646 0.5708 0.0116 0.0116 0.9662 0.9674 0.9797 0.9806
Uttaranchal 0.5136 0.5213 0.0112 0.0112 0.9830 0.9826 0.9797 0.9801
Assam 0.5056 0.5127 0.0104 0.0104 0.9785 0.9789 0.9793 0.9801
Goa 0.5198 0.5523 0.0112 0.0119 0.9592 0.9549 0.9773 0.9748
Bihar 0.5318 0.5547 0.0110 0.0115 0.9708 0.9644 0.9806 0.9777
Jammu and Kashmir 0.5474 0.5521 0.0107 0.0107 0.9922 0.9904 0.9809 0.9805
Meghalaya 0.5229 0.5316 0.0104 0.0104 0.9274 0.9285 0.9803 0.9812
Tripura 0.6336 0.6324 0.0102 0.0100 0.9912 0.9927 0.9808 0.9812
Manipur 0.6954 0.6939 0.0102 0.0100 1.0202 1.0227 0.9808 0.9811
Nagaland 0.7332 0.7348 0.0102 0.0101 1.0130 1.0152 0.9807 0.9812
Sikkim 0.7562 0.7814 0.0106 0.0109 1.0078 1.0103 0.9810 0.9811
Mizoram 0.9670 0.9685 0.0101 0.0100 1.0892 1.0916 0.9808 0.9811
Arunachal Pradesh 1.0000 1.0000 0.0101 0.0099 1.1766 1.1803 0.9808 0.9811
Table VII shows the level of the four different components of the Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2014) index for the 29 Indian
states before and after the construction of the GQ; wn is the wage (note that we have excluded labor endowment,
which is constant); P pcn is the aggregate price index in state n if all firms charged marginal cost; μbuyn represents the
aggregate markup charged on goods purchased in state n; μselln represents the aggregate markup charged on goods
produced in state n; Pn is the aggregate price index in state n.
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Table X
% Change in Total Trade between i and j (Model)
mean median sd/mean N
both i and j in GQ 5.11 4.33 3.21 78
(A) either i or j in GQ 1.40 -1.11 10.00 208
neither i nor j in GQ 1.88 0.39 7.37 120
Notes: Table X shows the mean, median, and coefficient of variation of the % change in total trade between states i
and j after the construction of the GQ; “both i and j in GQ” refers to state pairs in which both of them are crossed
by the GQ; “either i or j in GQ” refers to state pairs in which only one of them is crossed by the GQ; “neither i
nor j in GQ” refers to state pairs in which none of them are crossed by the GQ. The states crossed by the GQ are
Delhi, Bihar, Orissa, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Haryana, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. N is the number of state pairs that fall into the different categories.
Table XI
Prices, Allocative Efficiency and the GQ:
State-Level Differences-in-Differences
Data vs. Model
(A) Change in Prices (B) Change in OP Covariance
Data Model Data Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean dep. variable -0.8162 -0.0074 0.0749 0.0029
Estimated coefficient -0.3889∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0367 0.0031∗∗∗
(0.1182) (0.0001) (0.0303) (0.0001)
Relative effect of the GQ 1.48 2.75 1.49 2.04
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,658 129,514 1,930 24,669
R-Squared 0.58 0.11 0.09 0.37
Table XI shows the estimation of the state-level differences-in-differences regressions of prices
and allocative efficiency in the data and in the model-simulated data (equations 26 and 27
respectively). The dependent variables are the log change in the price of input j between
2001 and 2006 in state s (columns 1 and 2) and the change in the Olley and Pakes covariance
term between 2001 and 2006 (columns 3 and 4). The variable of interest is the connectivity
of the state, defined as a dummy variable taking value 1 if the state is crossed by the GQ
in 2006 but not in 2001. Input fixed effects are included in the specifications in columns
1, 2, and 4. Industry fixed effects are included in the specification in column 3. The effect
over the average state is computed as the ratio between the estimated coefficient over the
unconditional sample mean. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered at the state
level. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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Table XII
Prices and the Golden Quadrilateral:
District-Level Differences-in-Differences
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Log change input prices 2001 - 2006
District within 25 km from GQ -0.5932∗∗∗ -0.6011∗∗∗ -0.6737∗∗∗ -0.6178∗∗∗
(0.1489) (0.1544) (0.1970) (0.1876)
District within 50 km from GQ -0.5588∗∗∗ -0.5649∗∗∗ -0.5122∗∗ -0.4727∗∗
(0.1358) (0.1391) (0.2104) (0.1986)
District within 100 km from GQ -0.4139∗∗∗ -0.4184∗∗∗ -0.8373∗∗∗ -0.7383∗∗∗
(0.1499) (0.1542) (0.2371) (0.2128)
District within 150 km from GQ 0.0217 0.0349 -0.5550 -0.3210
(0.1476) (0.1517) (0.3740) (0.2231)
District within 200 km from GQ -0.0137 -0.0040 -0.2593 -0.2448
(0.1612) (0.1683) (0.2244) (0.2050)
District within 300 km from GQ -0.1113 -0.1061 0.1445 -0.0874
(0.1583) (0.1646) (0.2007) (0.1893)
Input Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES
Nodal Districts YES NO NO NO
Instrument - - Straight-line Straight-line
with Bangalore
Observations 5,123 5,037 5,037 5,037
Average R-Squared 0.42 0.42 - -
Number of Products 920 912 912 912
Table XII shows the results of the estimation of equation (28). The dependent variable is the log change in
the price of input j between 2001 and 2006 in district d. The variable of interest is the connectivity of the
district, defined as whether the district is within a certain distance from the GQ in 2006 and 2001. Each
row corresponds to a different regression, where different distances are considered. Columns (1) includes all
districts whereas column (2) excludes nodal districts. Column (3) instruments the distance to the GQ with the
distance to the straight line connecting the four vertices of the GQ (Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, and Calcutta).
Column (4) instruments with the distance to the straight line connecting the five vertices of the GQ (adding
Bangalore). Input fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis,
clustered at the district level. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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Table XIII
Allocative efficiency and the Golden Quadrilateral:
District-level Differences-in-Differences
OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Change in Covariance Term 2001 - 2006
District within 25 km from GQ 0.0143 0.0196 0.0247 0.0231
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0174) (0.0163)
District within 50 km from GQ 0.0139 0.0180 0.0192 0.0164
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0159) (0.0149)
District within 100 km from GQ 0.0249∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0138 0.0158
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0162) (0.0148)
District within 150 km from GQ 0.0131 0.0168 0.0266 0.0238∗
(0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0163) (0.0141)
District within 200 km from GQ 0.0161 0.0201∗ 0.0210 0.0233∗
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0149) (0.0130)
District within 300 km from GQ 0.0023 0.0057 -0.0087 0.0013
(0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.0130)
Input Fixed-Effects YES YES YES YES
Nodal Districts YES NO NO NO
Instrument - - Straight-line Straight-line
with Bangalore
Observations 6,832 6,721 6,721 6,721
Average R-Squared 0.02 0.02 - -
Number of Industries 117 117 117 117
Table XIII shows the estimation of equation (29). The dependent variable is the change between 2001
and 2006 of the Olley and Pakes (1996) within-industry cross-sectional covariance between the fraction
of industry labor used by the plant and labor productivity in industry (NIC) j and district d. The
variable of interest is the connectivity of the district, which takes value one if the district was within
a certain distance of the Golden Quadrilateral in 2006 but not in 2001, and zero otherwise. Each row
corresponds to a different regression, where different distances are considered. Columns (1) includes all
districts whereas column (2) excludes nodal districts. Column (3) instruments the distance to the GQ
with the distance to the straight line connecting the four vertices of the GQ (Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai,
and Calcutta) and excludes nodal districts. Column (4) instruments with the distance to the straight
line connecting the five vertices of the GQ (adding Bangalore) and excludes nodal districts. Industry
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, clustered at
the district level. Significance levels: ∗: 10%; ∗∗: 5%; ∗∗∗: 1%.
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